The impact of the Hill-Burton regulations on hospitals as organizations. by Carter, Carol Lee
THE IMPACT OF THE HILL-BURTON REGULATIONS
ON HOSPITALS AS ORGANIZATIONS
by
Carol Lee Carter
A.B., Clark University
(1977)
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
May 19 79
Signature of Author...
Certified by...............................................................
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by................................................................
Chairman, MCP Committee
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE Department of Urban Studies and Planning
OF TECHNOLOGY
0 G T i 1979
LIBRARIES
THE IMPACT OF THE HILL-BURTON REGULATIONS
ON HOSPITALS AS ORGANIZATIONS
by
Carol Lee Carter
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on May 25, 1979 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Masters of City Planning.
ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the effects of a regulation, the Community
Service Requirement of the Hill-Burton Act, on a particular hospital. The
regulation requires that hospitals which received Federal construction
grants or loans (1946 to present) provide uncompensated services to indi-
gents. The effects of the regulation are analyzed at two levels; first,
the outcomes of the regulation (the amount of free care provided) are
described; and second, its effects on the hospital organization are exa-
mined. This second level of analysis provides insight into the long-term
effects and success of the regulation.
Several hypotheses about the impact of the regulation on the hospi-
tal organization were developed. First, it was hypothesized that hospitals
make compliance decisions based solely on financial considerations, not out
of any social responsibility. Second, the hospital may choose to leave
eligibility guidelines flexible to give itself some discretion in decision-
making. Third, the regulation may have had dysfunctional consequences such
as the hospital may try to "process" indigents quickly to minimize the un-
collectable bill. Fourth, the hospital administration seeks stability
which leads it to comply with the regulation when the costs of non-compli-
ance are too great. Last, the physician's professionalism circumscribes
his behavior and limits the impact of the regulation on his treatment of
patients.
Through analyses of the history of the regulation, financial rec-
ords, interviews, and minutes of meetings, it is concluded that although
the amount of free care given out annually has increased, the accessibility
of medical care has not been significantly improved. By highlighting the
goals and impact of the regulation on various actors in the free care
delivery process, it is shown that the individual actors respond to per-
sonal and departmental goals, not necessarily in concert with the objective
of providing free care.
The study concludes that the original goals of the Hill-Burton Act
were long since met but that the last remaining objective, providing free
care, has not been totally met. Suggestions are made to improve the pre-
sent regulatory system. However, it is noted that the remaining issue of
inaccessible care could be more effectively addressed with other redistrib-
utive programs.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence S. Bacow, Assistant Professor
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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PREFACE
The health care system is increasingly being regulated. Often,
these regulations are ineffective because they do not take into account
the organizational structure which they are attempting to change. I was
interested in studying two different aspects of regulation. First, I
wanted to analyze a regulation as a solution to a problem--what was its
purpose, how did it attempt to work, and was it successful? Second, I
wanted to understand how hospitals react to imposed regulation. How
does the organization accomodate change, are the changes permanent, and
what levers can the regulation use most effectively?
I felt that if I could understnad how the hospital was impacted
by the regulation and how it responded, that this-information would feed
back into the regulatory design process in developing more effective
regulation. If the hospital is going to be increasingly regulated,
there might as well be fair and effective policies.
- I am well aware of the fact that my own attitudes about the health
care system have colored my perception of the issues discussed in this
thesis. Two attitudes seem particularly important to address here before
I begin. First, I believe that the current financing system of health
care is totally inadequate in the coverage it provides. This inadequacy
results in a lack of finances which act as a barrier to health care for
thousands of Americans. Second, I feel that the hospitals are limited in
their ability to control costs until the power of physicians is reduced.
Until then, hospitals will continue to have minimal control over the real
leverage points for containing costs and improving "efficiency." In many
ways, the hospitals are in the position of being increasingly regulated
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yet having very limited options in terms of the meaningful changes that
it can make.
The thesis begins with a description of the history of the regula-
tion and analyzes its general impacts in light of the original objectives.
Next, the implementation of the regulation of the case hospital is ex-
plained and its outcomes are summarized. The effects of the regulation
on the hospital organization are then outlined, revealing both functional
and dysfunctional consequences. Finally, the study concludes with several
recommendations to improve the present regulation and alternative redis-
tributive programs are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY
Selection of the Regulation
This study analyzes the implementation of the Community Service
Requirement of the Hill-Burton Act (Federal Register 42 CRF 53.111).
Although this Act was passed in 1946, the clause that requires facilities
"provide uncompensated services" was overlooked for almost twenty years.
When this provision was reenacted, it specifically required hospitals to
give free or reduced cost care to individuals who needed it. The regula-
tion employs a number of sanctions designed to encourage compliance,
ranging from bad publicity to impeding Certificate of Need applications
and further Hill-Burton funding.
This regulation was selected for analysis for several reasons.
First, it directly affected hospital finances and service availability
through the funding offered by the Hill-Burton Office. I figured regula-
tions which had dollars attached to them would be effective. Second, the
regulation itself is straightforward and appears to be simple to implement.
Hospitals are required to process applications for free care on the basis
of eligibility guidelines and to "award" free care. Third, the regulation
appealed to my social conscious by attempting to improve the accessibility
of medical care. Finally, the regulation had enough of a history to un-
derstand the changes it has undergone and to assess its impact.
The Hospital
I will call the hospital chosen for this study Prescott Hospital.
It is located within a metropolitan area in a town of about 100,000. It
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was founded in 1887 and currently offers medical/surgical, obstetric,
pediatric, and psychiatric services. Prescott is both a teaching affiliate
and a community hospital, whose status seems to fluctuate depending on the
immediate circumstances. Like most hospitals, it began as a charity
service to the poor--while the rich were treated at home. As the distinct
advantages of hospital treatment became apparent the hospital clientele
shifted to consisting of middle and upper middle.class patients. Many
physicians, reflecting back on pre-regulation days, described the hospital
as being a "club" for both doctors and socialites. As a middle class
institution, payment was never an issue at the admitting desk. It was
assumed that anyone admitted could afford the hospital bill. Therefore,
when indigents were admitted, they were not subject to questions about
their finances. This middle class status still exists; thus there is
little pressure on the hospital to expand its provision of free care.
Prescott Hospital was selected for two reasons. First, the hospital
is of average size--it is not a large teaching hospital, nor is it a small
community hospital. In addition, it is a private hospital and therefore
is relatively uninvolved with local city politics or a religious group.
I wanted to eliminate as many outside special interests as possible so that
I could come close to looking exclusively at how the organization was af-
fected by an imposed regulation. Second, the administration was genuinely
interested in the project and its findings. The chief administrator
offered total cooperation and seemed to understand the study's purpose
and conceptualization. I felt this support was extremely important in
order to gain access to information and interviews with various staff
members. Similarly, initial interviews with the individuals directly
involved with the administration of the regulation revealed that they too
-8-
were interested in the project and therefore were going to be very helpful
and accessible.
Methodology
This thesis takes the form of a case study. After selecting the
hospital and drawing up several hypotheses to investigate, I spent about
five weeks at the hospital collecting data. Various methodologies were
employed. First, I interviewed about 30 staff, the interviews taking
between one to one and a half hours. My technique was to go into the
interview with a list of topics and to get the individual talking. If
all the topics were not covered I would ask specific questions. The topics
covered generally included the following: what they thought of the concept
of providing free care; how they administered its provision or how they
were involved with the free care delivery process; their impression of how
successful the hospital was at reaching indigents; their impressions of how
other hospital staff reacted and implemented the policies of treating in-
digenti; how the system of providing free care could be improved; and
their impressions of the State Hill-Burton Office. Obviously, the list of
topics shifted depending on who was being interviewed. For example, I did
not ask the Board members about the State Office since the Board has no
contact with that office. Rather, I concentrated my questions about how
the Board made its policies, whether the Board was concerned about provid-
ing free care since doing so created hospital losses, and the relationship
1 Persons interviewed included: 3 physicians, Chief of Medicine,
the Chief Executive, 1 assistant administrator, 1 nurse, inpatient and out-
patient accounts managers, 1 from the Controller's Office, assistant Fiscal
administrator, 1 from Quality Assurance, 3 from Social Services, 1 from
psychiatric services, and 2 members of the Board of Trustees.
-9-
the Board sought with the community.
The second method of data collection was to review the records and
minutes of the Free Care Committee (FCC)2 meetings. These minutes indicate
changes in policies and procedures, describe issues being discussed in the
meetings, and document the exact decisions made for each week's applica-
tions. The records kept by the FCC Secretary include the applications,
the FCC responses to each application, and monthly and annual tabulation
of statistics. Statistics are kept on the number of acceptances and
denials, the number of preadmission acceptances, the number of acceptances
which are inside and outside the service area, the dollar amount of free
care and reduced cost care given out by both the inpatient and outpatient
departments, and quarterly figures on individuals accepted and the dollar
amount. These statistics are used to write the annual compliance report
required by the State Office. These annual reports were also reviewed for
both their statistical content and the policies officially taken by the
hospital. These reports were compared with the documents of the FCC for
consistency. From these documents it was also possible to see how the
Committee's policies have changed since 1976.
In addition to the interviews and collection of statistics and
documents, I observed the Committee in action. By attending these meetings
I was able to observe how the Committee deviated from its stated policies,
the informal decision-making which goes on but does not get recorded, and
the discretion involved in seemingly straightforward policies. Moreover,
it allowed me a chance to observe the dynamics of the FCC, the relation-
2 The FCC is an eleven member committee which meets weekly to re-
view and decide on all inpatient applications and outpatient accounts ex-
ceeding $100.
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ships of various groups within the hospital, and the total environment
which affects the decisions taken weekly. These observations proved to be
invaluable in piecing together and understanding the behavior and incen-
tives of the actors in the application process.
Although the case study format is often used in theses out of con-
venience, this methodology was well suited to my interests. In trying to
study regulation and its impact on organizations, it is necessary to do
analyses at two levels. First, from an outcome point of view, I was
interested in the effect of the regulation on the amount of free care
provided. I wanted to evaluate the "success" of the regulation. Second,
I wanted to study how the regulation affected the organizational struc-
ture--how decisions were made and by whom? Did the regulation cause any
adjustments in terms of personnel and authority? Did it create incen-
tives for actors to act in certain ways? A case study lends itself very
well to these two objectives by integrating data analysis and an organiza-
tional study. It allows the different methodologies (interviewing, data
and document analysis, and observation) to be used simultaneously in a
complementary way. For example, the accuracy of perceptions recorded
during interviews can be checked with data and vice versa. Similarly,
these statistics do not reveal anything about how an organization adjusts
to imposed regulation and how decisions are made. Yet all of this infor-
mation is necessary if we are to understand the long-term success and
effectiveness of the regulation.
Thus, the case method improves the accuracy and range of the data
collection, allows for a synthesis of the functional significance of the
various actors within the larger organization, and encompasses explanatory
hypotheses testing. Put another way, the case study method allows for
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alternative conceptual frameworks besides causal determination, such as
the systems and dramaturgic approaches. The systems approach attempts to
explain the interrelationships of the various actors,while the dramaturgic
approach identifies issues and actors, and the story line of the action
taken. These two frameworks are much more meaningful than causal deter-
mination when trying to explain organizational behavior.3
For all the above mentioned reasons, a case study seemed to be the
most flexible and complete form for my research. Needless to say it is
not perfect. The greatest criticism of case studies is that they are not
"typical" and cannot be representative of other experiences. Any general-
izations which are made based on one case study are subject to revision
with the investigation of other cases. However, as Peter Blau pointed
out, it is probably better to propose generalizations which later have to
be modified than not to present any at all.4
3
Robert Weiss and Martin Rein, "The Evaluation of Broad-Aim Pro-
grams: Experimental Design, Its Difficulties, and an Alternative," in
Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1970, pp. 97-109.
4 Peter Blau, Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1963), p. 99.
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HISTORY OF THE HILL-BURTON ACT
Introduction
This next section describes the history of the Hill-Burton Act
from its conceptualization in 1946 to present. The Act has undergone
many revisions with its goals changing considerably in the process. In
addition, Massachusetts has adopted its own set of requirements and
sanctions for non-compliance. The history is analyzed to outline 1) the
purposes of the bill the Congress intended, and 2) the general impacts
which the Act has had with respect to its objectives.
The Initial Bill
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act, often referred to as the
Hill-Burton Act (or Title VI of the Public Health Service Act, PL79-725),
was passed in 1946. The Hill-Burton Act represented the first major
involvement of the federal government in the development of health care
facilities. By offering grants-in-aid, it sought to 1) survey the
nation's need for hospital facilities and develop programs of construction
and 2) construct public and non-profit hospitals. The grants were awarded
to facilities on the basis of relative need (number of beds/1,000 popula-
tion), relative size of state population, and per capita income. In Mas-
sachusetts the approximate average size of grant was $236,035, represent-
ing on average 25% of the total cost of the project.5 The Act responded
to the lack and poor distribution of health facilities and attempted to
initiate the planning of such services. It was particularly aimed at
5 Estimated from a random sample of projects (1947-1970). Actually
this figure would be larger if the figures used had been in constant 1970
dollars. Figures from Hill-Burton Project Register, July 1, 1947 -
June 30, 1970. DREW, Public Health Service, Rockville, Maryland.
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reducing the differences in service availability between states and
between rural and urban areas.
Although the bill was introduced by senators from rural states
(Senator Hill of Alabama and Senator Burton of Ohio), it received support
from both urban and rural communities. The 1946 Hearings reflected
strong support from community and national leaders, the hospital industry,
health care professionals, farmers, and blue collar workers. Specifically,
testimony was heard from such diverse groups as the American Medical
Association (AMA), American Hospital Association, Catholic Hospital
Association, American Federation of Labor, U.S. Steelworkers of America,
U.S. Conference of Mayors, National Farmers Union, American Farm Bureau
Federation, Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the National Council
of Parents and Teachers.
Such strong support has three probable explanations. First, after
World War II the country was in desperate need of health facilities con-
struction and medical care. About 40% of the 3,000 counties were without
6
a registered hospital. Moreover, about 50,000 physicians had been re-
leased from the army and needed working space. Data such as bed and
physicians per thousand population by state, maternal deaths, and infant
mortality were used to support the need for facilities.
In addition, the tendency of these newly released physicians to
locate in urban areas further intensified urban/rural differences. This
exerted pressure on rural areas to develop facilities and thereby attract
doctors. This decentralization hoped to improve both the distribution of
6 Testimony of Mr. Erickson, American Public Health Association,
Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, "Hospital Construction Act" S.191, March 7, 1946.
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medical resources and the general health of the rural population. The
Surgeon General contended that "maldistribution is singly the most impor-
tant factor in deterring adequate health care." 7
Arguments were also made that the lack of rural care induced
migration to urban areas, which could not afford to be indifferent to the
needs of rural people.8 Essentially, the Act responded to a general need
for hospitals, and in particular favored rural facilities.
A second probable explanation is simply that increasing the supply
of medical facilities had few, if any, opponents. Every interest group
had something to gain, whether it was the financiers of construction
projects or rural farmers. This broad coalition guaranteed passage of
the bill. Of particular importance was the support of the AMA, who
Surgeon General Parran commented "contributed unquestionably to the
ready acceptance of the bill." 9
Third, support for the Act echoed the New Deal philosophy that the
government was assuming new roles. One such role was being the provider
of last resort for medical services, previously played by charity organi-
zations and the church. Due to the increasing costs of construction and
medical care, such institutions could no longer rely on church support and
philanthropy to cover their operating and construction costs. Therefore,
the government assumed this responsibility, reflecting the increase in
Testimony of Surgeon General Parran, U.S. Health Service,
Hearings, March 7, 1946, p. 15.
8 Testimony of Mrs. Weagly, President of the Association of Women
of the American Farm Bureau Federation, Hearings, March 7, 1946, p. 136.
9 Thomas Parran, ACMEL Papers and Discussions, 1947, p. 19,
quoted in James G. Burrow, AMA: Voice of American Medicine (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 287.
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acceptability and legitimacy of the "welfare state."
An additonal argument was made that more facilities could induce
10
preventive medicine and thereby reduce medical costs. Given the over-
whelming support for this bill, it is unlikely that this last rationale
was necessary to ensure its passage. It is, however, interesting to note
this presently used argument as early as 1946.
The regulations specified that any facility receiving Hill-Burton
assistance must provide assurances to the State that it would furnish a
"reasonable volume of services" to persons unable to pay. Although
"reasonable volume" was not defined, the "free services" could take the
form of free care or care offered at a reduced cost. It is not clear how
this goal of providing free services was linked to those of hospital con-
struction--it was not directly addressed in any of the testimony nor in
the Senate or House reports. It appears to be an insignificant qualifier
probably to mention that hospitals, which historically had always given
free care to indigents, should continue to provide uncompensated services.
Perhaps it also reinforced the notion that community hospitals (fairly new
institutions) should provide free services to indigents, a role which had
always been played by government and church-run hospitals. This implies
a desire to distribute fairly the costs of providing free care; however,
this was not made explicit. This clause was included in all subsequent
amendments and extensions and was not questioned or clearly defined until
the early 1970's.
Each state had to develop a State Plan to ensure that there were
adequate facilities to provide a reasonable volume of free care. This
10 Testimony of Honorable Chandler, Vice-President of the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, Hearings, March 7, 1946, p. 110.
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state office was also responsible for surveying need and allocating funds.
At the federdl level, the Surgeon General approved State Plans and indi-
vidual projects. The Surgeon General could halt certification of new
projects or withhold all funds otherwise payable if it was determined
that a state agency was not ensuring a reasonable volume of free care.
Hill-Burton is Expanded
In 1954 this Act was expanded with the "Medical Facilities Survey
and Construction Act" to specifically include grants to diagnostic and
treatment (outpatient) centers, rehabilitation centers, and hospitals for
the chronically ill. In 1964, the Hill-Burton was further amended to
modernize any existing facility. This program, the "Hospitals and Medical
Facilities Amendments of 1964," had a marked effect on improving old urban
hospitals which desperately needed renovations but had "enough" beds to
disqualify them from funds previously earmarked for new construction.
Loans are Offered
In 1970, over Nixon's veto, the Hill-Burton was again amended and
extended. The "Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amend-
ments" provided two major changes: first, it shifted emphasis from pro-
jects in rural poverty areas to include any poverty area; and second,
it supplemented the grants program with loans and loan guarantees. Most
of the new construction was for long-term care beds and out-patient
clinics. This amendment responded to the growing needs for ambulatory
facilities and services in poverty areas and the virtually non-existent
demand for the construction of new, short-term hospital beds.
-17-
"Reasonable Volume" Defined
There was increasing concern over the lack of specificity of the
1947 statute regarding the reasonable volume of free service to be offered
for those individuals unable to pay. In response to several court cases
which were pending, HEW issued new regulations (July 22, 1972) which de-
fined a reasonable volume of free services, furnished guidelines to state
agencies on eligibility criteria and qualifying services, and set forth
requirements for evaluation and enforcement of compliance. Specifically,
it stated that a reasonable volume could be satisfied by: 1) offering
free or below cost services annually equaling the lesser of either
- 3% of operating costs, not including Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement, or
- 10% of total Federal assistance received (no provisions
for amortizing capital grants were made);
or 2) certifying that free or below cost services would not be refused to
any persons regardless of their ability to pay (the "open door" policy).11
Services were to be valued at their cost determined by Medicare formulae
(Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 USC 1395).
In addition, the state agencies were to monitor and evaluate each
facility's compliance, with each facility reporting its level of uncom-
pensated services, except for these facilities choosing the "open door"
option. The Act did not, however, provide specific funds for the monitor-
ing or auditing of operating costs or levels of free care dispensed. The
evaluation simply required matching the required amount of free services
with that amount of services, relying heavily on the honesty of the
facility. Given the lack of funds to ensure honest reporting and the
11 Federal Register, Vol. 37, No. 142, July 22, 1972 153.l1l(d)
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number of hospitals to be monitored (about 150 in Massachusetts in 1979),
the state office has little choice but to rely on complaints to monitor
compliance.
The eligibility requirements for receiving free care were also to
be determined by the state agency based on the following set of criteria:
insurance coverage; income and other resources; family size; and other
financial obligations. The time limits for these obligations were 20
years for grants and the entire payback period for loans.
With the enactment of the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974 (PL93-641) and the final extension of the Hill-
Burton expiring, the Hill-Burton Title VI was replaced by Title XVI of
PL93-641. Like Title VI, Title XVI-assisted applicants had to give
assurances of offering free services. Although the original Hill-
Burton goals had been met long ago, its evolution of new goals through
various amendments kept the Hill-Burton alive. The 1974 revisions saw
as its objectives: 1) providing outpatient facilities in poor areas;
2) modernization of existing facilities; and 3) construction of new
facilities in areas which have experienced rapid population growth.
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ANALYSIS
The Legislative History
There are several points worth noting about the regulations
presently in existence. First, it is probably safe to infer that Congress,
in amending and extending the Hill-Burton program, did not realize that it
was also expanding the availability of free care. There is no such ac-
knowledgement in either the hearings or committee reports.
Also of interest is the way in which the volume of free services
was calculated in the 1972 regulations. Not only did it ignore the dis-
tribution of these benefits (how many people or who received the free
care) but it also created potential perverse incentives.. If the purpose
of Hill-Burton was to fund hospital construction where it was needed,
linking the amount of federal aid to providing free services could have
induced overinvestment in capital intensive facilities. These could then
be offered free of charge to indigents to fulfill the requirements of the
law. These possible incentives to overbuild did not exist before the 1972
regulations and therefore could have affected only those projects built
after this date. Since then, only ambulatory facilities have been funded,
minimizing its potential impact on the supply of medical facilities. By
not specifying the distribution or kinds of services to be delivered, the
regulation could have also induced hospitals to provide intensive care to
few patients (such as numerous lab tests, hospitalization when outpatient
services could suffice). This is particularly of interest for facilities
located in relatively affluent communities where there are few eligible
indigents. It has been speculated that hospitals in these areas provide
free care to individuals who technically do not qualify, due to the lack
of indigents.
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In many states, the major problem of the Hill-Burton amendments has
been the minimal efforts to enforce the community service requirements.
Ineffective implementation has resulted in the lack of provision of free
care in many Hill-Burton funded facilities. In addition, due to the
scarcity of resources to monitor and enforce compliance, the state
agencies lack the ability to effectively enforce these requirements.
Essentially there was no regulatory stick. The cutoff of funds (the only
federal sanction) was two steps removed from the regulated facility, in
that the Surgeon General does not regulate the hospitals but rather
regulates the state agencies. The state agencies in turn regulate the
facilities. This made the regulation difficult to enforce.
The Massachusetts Experience
As in other areas of health care regulation, Massachusetts seems to
be ahead of most states in the regulatory role assumed by the state Hill-
Burton office. Responding to Federal mandate to develop free care regula-
tions, the Department of Public Health passed "Minimum Level of Uncompen-
sated Medical Services" Regulations in 1974, "Community Service" Regula-
tions in 1975, and Amendments in 1976. They defined medical indigents as
persons with a family income of less than $4,000 per year plus $600 per
dependent. Exceptions can be made if the extent of third party coverage
size of family, or other financial obligations and resources would impose
an unreasonable financial burden. This allows each facility considerable
discretion in determining each applicant's eligibility. The services
which are to be provided include all services normally delivered by that
facility (or that unit if only a specific unit of a larger facility was
funded). The state regulations also mandated that signs be posted in-
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dicating the availability of uncompensated services and a notice be
included with the first bill for emergency visits.
The State Hill-Burton Office set more enforceable and tangible
sanctions on hospitals found to be out of compliance. The first step
towards using sanctions is simply to ask the hospital to deliver the
services in question or to deliver a greater volume of free care. if
this tactic fails, sanctions which can be used include: 1) publicizing
non-compliance in the local newspaper; 2) notifying HEW which can affect
other funds of the hospital: 3) delicensing the hospital, thereby elim-
inating its Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements (and effectively reducing
its daily census); 4) initiating a court case; and 5) notifying the De-
partment of Public Health, whoreviews all Determination of Need applica-
tions. The potential impact non-compliance can have on Certificate of
Need and on community relations has promoted compliance in many hospitals.
The Office has also outlined specific annual reporting procedures
required of every funded facility. The reporting form calculates the cost
of the uncompensated services (not the charges) and requires that the fol-
lowing documents accompany the form: -the annual financial statement re-
quired by the Rate Setting Commission; the written procedure for deter-
mining free care also filed with the Rate Setting Commission; the notice
of the Hill-Burton regulation and its translations; the Community Services
Admissions statement; and the Community Services notice as it appears in
the newspaper.
While all of these requirements attempt to improve compliance, it
is still difficult for the office to evaluate its success. Some hospitals
do not file complete reports (or a report at all) and the accuracy of
these reports is not checked. In addition, no one in the office is an
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accountant so that spot audits would have limited ability to uncover non-
compliance. tThey do, however, bring the results of non-compliance closer
to home and this acts as an effective deterrent. Not only are hospital
administrators prone to obey the law, but the last thing most of them
want is bad publicity.
New Proposed Regulations
Serious concern over the degree of non-compliance and problems of
enforcement are not limited to this state--clearly they are widespread,
for in October 1978 proposed regulations appeared in the Federal Register
for comment. These new regulations attempt to ensure that: 1) all
facilities which received Hill-Burton funds are providing the required
amount of uncompensated services; 2) services are provided to those who
should get them; and 3) services are distributed in a fair manner. The
proposed changes include eliminating the state role (to be taken over by
the DHEW),-which it is argued, has been ineffective as both evaluator and
monitorer. Moreover, it makes eligibility requirements uniform throughout
the country, thereby removing the facility's and state's discretion as to
who can receive free care. It also reduces the options by which a facility
can determine how it will met the "reasonable volume of free care" by elim-
inating the "open door" option. It was argued that this has been a source
of improper policy implementation because it is practically impossible to
monitor, particularly since financial records are not required to be kept
in most states. The proposal also addresses criticisms made regarding the
lack of publicity of the Hill-Burton assistance and requires that notices
be given to all individuals seeking services and that multi-lingual signs
be visibly posted.
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The hearings for these proposed regulations were held on December
5-6 and no fInal regulations have been issued. It is very likely that the
hearings will yield modifications given that the hospital industry was
against such "arbitrary" regulatory "overkill" which "seeks to expand
the hospital's contractual obligations and impose unnecessary administra-
tive burdens . . . ignoring their voluntary compliance efforts."12 .The
American Hospital Association argued that hospitals have been meeting
their obligations, that such proposals are unlawful and that their burdens
could damage the hospitals' ability to deliver quality care. However,
consumer representatives alleged that hospitals have failed to offer
information on the availabilty of free care, that posted signs often were
absent or inaccessible to patients, that physicians refused to treat
charity patients, that hospitals have initiated collection proceedings
against individuals who claimed to be eligible for free care, and that
both federal and state agencies failed to enforce Hill-Burton regulations.
Purpose of the Regulation
It should be clear from this brief account of the regulation's
history that the purpose of the Hill-Burton has evolved with each of its
amendments. In 1946, its intent was to increase the supply of general
hospitals, to plan such construction, and thereby improve the distribution
of health facilities. This purpose expanded to include more specialized
services, ambulatory facilities, modernizations, and facilities in urban
poverty areas. In general, these goals shifted with the adoption of
amendments. For example, in 1948 7% of the Hill-Burton funds went for new
12 American Hospital Association, Health Law Vigil. December 15,
1978, AHA Testimony, p. 1.
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construction. One year after the goal of modernization was instituted
(1965) 15% of the funds wont for new construction, while the remaining
85% went for modernization. This trend continued as emphasis on new
construction shifted to other priority areas and in 1974 only 3% of the
13
funds went for such projects.
Until 1972 the reasonable volume of uncompensated services re-
mained ambiguous and unquestioned. However, increasing pressures from
court cases demanded that a working definition be established. This
indicates that the Hill-Burton, whether originally intended as such or not,
has become a source of community charity in the form of free services.
This purpose may not have been emphasized in its original regulations due
to the fact that hospitals have always given a certain amount of free care,
incurred as bad debts, and a further elaboration of commitment was un-
necessary. However, escalating health care costs and the proliferation of
social services in the 'sixties may have served as impetus for more spe-
cific (and, in many cases, expanded) obligations. Thus, implicitly, a
goal of accessibility has been established. The measure of accessibilty
(amount of free care) is very sloppy, probably because it was a secondary
goal. By specifying a dollar amount or "open door" policy, rather than
number of persons treated or some measure of the distribution of benefits,
the policy is open to numerous implementations with varying results.
Impact of the Regulation
With respect to the initial goals of the Hill-Burton Act, the regula-
13
"Legislative History on National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act," U.S. Congressional and Administrative News, Vol. 4, 1974,
p. 7863.
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tion has been widely viewed as successful. Between 1947 and 1974 almost
500,000 beds'have been constructed or modernized at a cost of $14.5 million.
For the same time period, it was responsible for an average of 8% of the
total health construction costs. Though seemingly insignificant, these
improvements have significantly reduced the imbalances between states and
between rural and urban areas. The development of rural facilities has
also helped to attract physicians to these regions. Much of the success
has been due to the programs' adaptability to changing needs and the
recognition of the limitations of the original act. Many of the amend-
ments try to compensate for these omissions by categorically setting aside
special grants. Although much less successful, the program did help in
health planning efforts by both raising licensing standards and improving
the design and operation of health facilities.
However, not all reports are so positive. The Committee Report
prepared to the Subcommittee on Health had the following criticisms:
1) lack of planning had resulted in too many facilities
with duplication;
2) rural migration had resulted in overbedding in some areas;
3) the need for Hill-Burton loans and grants had decreased
due to the availability of other, equally attractive
options for financing costs. 14
The resultant overbedding tends to be overemphasized. The Hill-
Burton favored funding small, community hospitals which normally have
lower occupancy rates. Despite these and other criticisms the hospitals
have been candidates for refunding because of the lack of ambulatory ser-
14 U.S. Senate, Committee Report prepared for the Subcommittee on
Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, "Hill-Burton Hospital
Survey and Construction Act: History and Current Problems and Issues,"
1973.
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vices and gaps existing in third party financing of health care for the
poor. This recognition of the program's shortcomings, yet consistent
refunding and justification, seemed typical of the debate surrounding
extensions of the program, particularly since 1970. The conflict seems
to stem from varying conceptions of the program's objectives. Opponents
saw the program as a construction act whose goal had been met. On the
other hand, proponents saw it as having multiple goals which had evolved
with the numerous amendments.
The extent to which the Hill-Burton Act provided uncompensated
services is difficult to determine. Many hospitals (65%)15 chose to
comply via the "open door" policy which does not require-financial report-
ing (many critics claim that this is why this option is so popular). The
state agencies have not monitored or enforced compliance in part due to a
lack of personnel (which may reflect a lack of priority--these offices
probably see their primary role as securing Hill-Burton funds, not guaran-
teeing access for the poor). Generally, they rely on complaints to
monitor compliance. In a GAO report issued in 1974 which reviewed the
implementation of the Hill-Burton free service policy, it concluded that
most hospitals were indeed complying with the regulations. However, the
accuracy of these findings can be questioned. Due to "time constraints"
the reporters relied on the records at state agencies and did not verify
any information. Of their sample of 20 facilities, only six kept finan-
cial records, which were not checked for their validity. The report's
accuracy essentially depends on the assumed accuracy of the records and
15 Testimony of Mr. Ahart, GAO Office, before the Subcommittee cn
Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, "Implementation
of the Hill-Burton Amendments, 1974," Hearings, November 25, 1974, p. 89.
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oral comments, which as other testimonies indicated, are highly suspect.
At the 1974 hearings there were other highly critical testimonies
which recounted the following:
1) Some facilities use loopholes to avoid accountability
for specific dollar amounts of free service.
2) Highly questionable expenses are accounted for in such
a way that hospitals appear to be in compliance.
3) Public notification of the availability of free service
is a farce.
4) Eligible people are turned away from service due to
arbitrary geographic restrictions and limitations on the
types of medical care given to indigents. Often, indi-
viduals who are eligible for other types of coverage
benefit at the expense of those who are not eligible for
other programs, the target population.
5) State agencies do not perform adequate evaluations and
often take the facilities at word for compliance.
6) Regional HEW offices condone this lack of effective
evaluation and enforcement by approving inadequate State
Plans and overlooking the states' failure to file annual
reports.16 This is probably because they see their
primary mission as dispensing Hill-Burton funds, not
monitoring compliance and thus attach little importance
to this function.
16 Testimony of Allan Crimm, Southern Governmental Monitoring Pro-
ject, before the Health Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, November 25, 1974. This project investigated the compli-
ance of 44 hospitals in eleven states.
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In summary, the impact of the Hill-Burton has been to increase and
improve the supply of health care facilities and in this sense has been a
positive impact. Recent amendments to improve and enforce accessibility
have, at best, mixed evaluations. Some facilities have conformed to this
regulation with little difficulty. Others have, at least, been attempting
to comply, while still others have done little except avoid compliance.
As mentioned previously, the way in which this policy of uncompensated
services is actually implemented and its distributive effects can vary
significantly. This, coupled with various degrees of compliance, make
the impacts of this policy difficult to estimate. It is clear that many
of the intended beneficiaries are still excluded from medical care.
Summary
It is difficult to assess some of the impacts of the regulation
because the State is not rigorous in its monitoring and it lacks complete
and accurate financial reports. Certainly part of the problem lies in
the design of the regulation and regulatory process--the State Office
does not have any incentives to monitor compliance and therefore it en-
forces the regulations so infrequently that the sanctions lose their ef-
fectiveness. My sense is that the State Office tries to maximize the
amout of Federal funds coming into the state. Enforcing the uncompen-
sated services requirement and uncovering non-compliance is inconsistent
with this objective. In addition, the goals of improving the access of
hospital services and providing free care may not be seen by the State
Office workers as either appropriate or realistic. These two goals may
be perceived as inappropriate because they were never formalized, but
rather, evolved into implicit objectives, and therefore workers are not
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evaluated with respect to these goals. Moreover, the goals may be un-
realistic, given the overwhelming institutional barriers. Thus, the
State workers choose other more obtainable goals to achieve. Moreover,
since the Federal government does not encourage monitoring or enforcement,
the State Office may simply reflect the low priority attached to these
functions. Although implicitly established as a goal, accessibility is
still not seriously considered in the evaluation of the regulation. The
only figure of concern to the State Office is dollars expended, a poor
proxy for patients treated and for accessibility. Because questions of
implementation are not addressed in the regulation, institutions have
considerable flexibility in adapting their own procedures for compliance.
The next chapter analyzes how one facility has implemented this
regulation and the kinds of results policies have had.
Hypotheses about the Impact of the Regulation on the Hospital
This section reviews the hypotheses about the effects of the regu-
lation'on the hospital. They are based on the history and purpose of the
Act, the characteristics of the hospital, and the shortcomings of the
regulation.
The first hypothesis is that the hospital acts to minimize its
financial burdens and therefore it selects the least expensive compliance
option. If the hospital is located in a poor, urban area we would expect
it to select a minimum volume requirement to limit its obligation. Con-
versely, a hospital in an affluent suburb would select an "open door"
policy to treat all indigents, and assuming that there would be few in-
digents to treat, the hospital would bear a minimal burden. The hospital
which is very community- or patient-oriented may be unaffected by the
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regulations and carry on business as it always has done.
It is 'also hypothesized that the regulation may have produced
dysfunctional consequences. For example, once it was clear that facili-
ties would have to provide free care, a potential recipient of funds may
have inflated the anticipated demand figures to accomodate serving the
indigent population. Or, the hospital staff would be encouraged to pro-
vide intensive care (high technology and expensive services) to few pa-
tients to use up its required amount of free care and ease its administra-
tion. Conversely, under the open door option, if the hospital is paying
the costs of care, it may monitor more closely free care patients to
"process" them as quickly as possible, thereby minimizing the hospital's
losses.
There is considerable room for interpretation in the state and
Federal guidelines, leading to many possible hypotheses about their exact
implementation in the hospitals. A hospital may want to keep the eligi-
bility guidelines vague, to ensure its own discretion in decision-making.
On the-other hand, hospitals may use this imprecision to tighten its own
policies and institute arbitrary restrictions on service areas or proce-
dures excluded from coverage. Given that the distinction between a bad
debt and free care is ambiguous the hospital may juggle these figures to
its advantage if there is a difference in reimbursement.
There are three hypotheses about the actions of the Chief Executive
Officer. First, he will try to keep losses at a minimum, thus minimizing
the amount of free care given out. Second, he will try to avoid bad
publicity that may jeopardize any pending Certificate of Need applica-
tions or future funding. This fundamental concern with stability leads
him to comply with the regulations when the costs of non-compliance are
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too great. Complaints filed with the State Office will induce compliance
and serve as la monitoring mechanism. Last, the retroactive nature of the
regulation will have produced many feelings of distrust and resentment
towards the government by the hospital administration.
The last two hypotheses focus on the behavior of physicians. On
the one hand, physicians will feel an instinctive professionalism which
will circumscribe their behavior and they will treat free care individuals
no differently than other patients. This could significantly limit the
effectiveness of cost controls by administration, since most hospital
costs are doctor prescribed. On the other hand, some physicians will
resent treating free care individuals knowing that it is unlikely that
they will ever receive payment for services rendered. Eventually, these
physicians will refuse to treat indigents leaving this burden to fall on
fewer physicians.
These hypotheses and themes structured my interviewing and data
analysis. Throughout the data gathering phase many themes were developed
and refined or discarded. One of the beauties of a case study is that
such refinement is possible and improves the research. For example, data
may collected, analyzed, and spur the collection of new data or the
development of new interview topics.
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CHAPTER TWO
TE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HILL-BURTON REGULATIONS
AT THE HOSPITAL
Introduction
Massachusetts regulations require each facility that has received
Hill-Burton funding to annually select a compliance option. The three
options, as specified in the Federal Regulations, are:
a) an amount of free care equal to 3% of its operating costs
excluding Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements;
b) an amount of free care equal to 10% of the total federal
assistance received;
c) the "open door" option, where a hospital ensures that no
individual will be refused admission because of their
inability to pay.
Based on a recommendation made by the Chief Fiscal Officer the
Board of Trustees determined that Prescott Hospital would operate under
option C, the "open door" policy. This option has been selected every
year because it is the cheapest option for the hospital. Until option
C is eliminated or the volume of free care given out exceeds a minimum
volume alternative the hospital will continue to elect the cheapest
option. As many interviewed admitted, this decision is strictly a
financial one, and is divorced from any social responsibility rationale
or community service obligation'.
This chapter examines how Prescott Hospital implemented the Hill-
Burton requirements to provide uncompensated services. First, it des-
cribes the policies and procedures adopted by the hospital: the
Under option A the hospital would have to provide $631,758 of
free care, and under option B $700,000. Last year the hospital pro-
vided only $453,372 worth of free care.
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application process; the eligibility criteria; and the decision-making
process. Second, it analyzes the free care process in terms of: 1) the
timing required to make the entire process successful; 2)' the impact of
the policies on accountability; 3) the leniency of the eligibility re-
quirements; and 4) the discretion of the decision-making body. Third,
the outcomes of the process are described and new policies and efforts
to "tighten up" are examined to evaluate their effect on the amount of
free care given out, the hospital losses, and accessibility of care.
We will see that although the dollar amount and the number of individuals
receiving free care have both increased, these do not necessarily improve
the accessibility of care to indigents. Given that one of the goals of
the uncompensated services requirement was to provide hospital care to
individuals who normally fall between the cracks of other existing pay-
ment systems, the regulation is not effective.
The Application Process
There are several different ways in which patients find out about
the availability of free care. For example, some patients acquire this
information at the time of admission, others find out during their stay
at the hospital, while still others discover free care sometime during
the dunning cycle. These methods accomodate for various circumstances
of the individual case such as whether the admission was emergency or
elective, whether the person is overly concerned about the financing of
the hospital bill, and the completeness and accuracy of the admission
forms' information. The entrees into the system occur at different
times in the free care application process, with the later applications
being more difficult to administer. These methods are described in
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chronological order of the application process.
All patients are interviewed and questioned about their finances
at the time of admission. Here the application form can identify the
patients who qualify for free care. In such cases, the admitting person
is instructed to provide the patient or guarantor with an application
for uncompensated services and may also help the individual complete the
form. (See Appendix A for a sample application form.) Note that already
there are three possible ways for this relatively straightforward proce-
dure to fail. The admitting desk may fail to give out the uncompensated
services form, the form may never be completed or returned, or the
patient may give inaccurate information and hence delay the entire
application process until the accounts department has checked out the
insurance number and discovered its validity.
The admitting office serves as an initial screen for the medically
indigent2 for all but emergency cases. However, for emergency admissions,
the admitting office route does not work. Not only are many patients
unable to complete the necessary forms but admission is basically granted
with no questions asked. These patients (and persons not picked up during
admitting) are not identified as medically indigent until services have
been rendered or while the patient is still in the hospital. This occurs
in one of four ways:
1) The nurse on the floor senses the patient's anxiety
about the costs and will notify social services.
2) Social services, in planning discharges, will discover
medical indigents.
2 Medically indigent is defined as those persons needing medical
attention but who cannot afford to pay for services.
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3) Patient accounts may uncover invalid or poor insurance
policies and contact the patient, who then may express
concern about his or her lack of funds.
4) In the dunning cycle an ex-patient may contact patient
accounts about his or her inability to pay the bill.
An application will then be sent to the patient.
Invariably the system of informing patients about the availability
of free care is ineffective for many reasons: a) the patient did not see
or understand the posted signs; b) his insurance policy is invalid but
only discovered as such months after services are rendered; c) the
policy is valid but incomplete in terms of his coverage; or d) he slips
through the system unnoticed. The free care application can be filed at
any time before collection efforts begin.3
The dunning cycle at the hospital is fairly lengthy and provides
a considerable time for an indigent to mention that he or she does not
have the finances. It consists of the first itemized bill, two re-
minders, and a pre-collection letter (essentially a not-so-nasty letter).
At this point uncollected accounts are turned over to a collection
agency. The pre-collection letter is effective for about 30% of the
accounts; for the remaining 70% the collection agency collects on 20-22%
of these accounts. If collection efforts fail, the amount is counted as
a bad debt.5
By law, accounts which have already gone to a collection agency
cannot be included in the category of "free care." Although these accounts
are uncompensated services, if the hospital goes to the extent of sending
them to a collection agency, it is argued that the intent of providing
free care has been invalidated.
The collection agency receives a percentage of the accounts
turned over to them.
5 The distinction between bad debt and free care is as follows:
"free care" is uncompensated services rendered to a patient who has
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Once an application is filed by the patient it is sent either to
the inpatient or outpatient accounts manager. The outpatient accounts
manager makes all decisions about free care himself, for bills under
$100, due to the small size of most bills (average bill is $48
volume of applications (about five to ten per day). He reviews the
applications and renders free care based on the guidelines established
by the Free Care Committee (FCC). Approximately 75% of these applica-
tions are accepted--this high acceptance ratio is a function of the
large proportion of the applicants that are either low-income (many poor
individuals use the outpatient department as their only source of medical
care and in place of a doctor visit) or transient. If the accounts
manager is unsure whether a patient qualifies for free care, if the bill
is in excess of $100 he presents the case to the Free Care Committee.
The decision process for inpatient accounts is much more complex.
All inpatient applications are presented to the Free Care Committee
which meets once a week to discuss and vote on applications. Although
applied for free care via the Hill-Burton application process. An
application may be filed at any time before collection action has been
taken. "Bad debt" are uncompensated services for which collection ef-
forts have been unsuccessful and thus the hospital is forced to incur
a loss.
Note that the amount actually lost by a hospital by incurring
bad debt or providing free care varies substantially as the following
example will illustrate. Assume there is $100,000 worth of uncompensated
services.
Free Care: $100,000 uncompensated services
- 30,000 reimbursed by Blue Cross at 30%
$ 70,000 LOSS
Bad Debt: $100,000 uncompensated services
- 30,000 receipts from collection efforts
- 2,000 fees for collection agency
$ 68,000
- 20,400 reimbursed by Blue Cross
$ 47,600 LOSS
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its decision is officially a recommendation to the chief fiscal officer,
it is not rigorously monitored. Essentially, the chief fiscal officer
has delegated total responsibility for the implementation of the Hill-
Burton to the FCC. Within a week, the decision has been sent to the
applicant unless it has been deferred due to a lack of information.
The Free Care Committee is an innovative response to the Hill-
Burton regulation. Most hospitals simply have a fiscal accounts person
review applicants and make determinations. At first this was the process
at this hospital but the director for fiscal affairs was so uncomfortable
making these important (at least to the individuals involved) decisions
and was aware of his own biases in making them that he initiated a Free
Care Committee to review the applications. To reduce the biases (or at
least balance them), the committee has a wide cross-section of members
from nursing (1), fiscal services (2), social services (3), psychiatry (1),
quality assurance (1), continuing care (1), controller's office (1), and
physical therapy (1).
. Another important innovation at this hospital, which was a direct
result of the Hill-Burton requirement, was the establishment of govern-
mental program coordinators in social services. Two individuals (one
for inpatients and one for outpatients) review free care applications
for potential eligibility for other programs such as workingman's com-
pensation, Medicaid, Medicare, social security, and other discharge
services like food stamps, AFDC, and general relief. The inpatient
coordinator in Fiscal Year 1978 saved the hospital over $173,000 by
transferring free care individuals to other government programs. In
fact, this has been so successful that the hospital recently hired an
outpatient coordinator to try to find alternative programs to bill for
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outpatients.
Individuals who apply for free care and who are not eligible for
other programs are reviewed and decided upon by the FCC. Any decision
may be appealed to the Free Care Committee for reconsideration based on
additional information. The guidelines which the committee uses to
determine eligibility are based on financial and medical need of pa-
tients who live in the hospital's service area. The guidelines are
listed below.
I. Financial Eligibility
A. Income of $5,000 per year for an individual, plus
$1,000 per year per dependent.
B. Other assets--$2,000 for an individual, $3,000 for
a couple. Assets include savings, trust funds,
stocks, property other than residence, etc.
C. A persons' car and home are not considered in
assessing eligibility.
D. For patients temporarily unemployed, work potential
is considered (i.e. educational level attained,
usual income when working, whether part-time, or
unemployment is voluntary).
II. Service Area
A. Service area is defined as Cambridge, Somerville,
Belmont, Watertown, Arlington, and Lexington.
B. Patients who apply should be permanent residents of
one of the above towns.
C. Exemptions to service area criteria:
1. Emergency admissions where patient comes to the
hospital as the closest facility.
2. Persons recently moved out of our service area
(3-6 months ago) who were residents and have
ties to the hospital.
D. Patients from out of the service area who come to
doctors on the staff are not exempted from the policy.
III. Medical Need
A. Service must be medically necessary at the time
rendered.
B. Services not covered include:
1. Cosmetic surgery.
2. Procedures that can safely be deferred.
3. In-hospital services that can be done on an
outpatient basis.
C. Whenever possible, eligibility is determined prior
to the rendering of services.
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IV. Students
A. Students must meet service area requirements.
B. Students claimed by parents for tax purposes must
provide families' financial information for con-
sideration.
ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS
The complete application process is outlined in Figure 1. This
diagram highlights the numerous steps involved in making uncompensated
services decisions. Needless to say there are many points at which the
process does break down. Even at the admitting desk, presumed to have
adopted a straightforward process, eligible patients are overlooked.
Timing
Ideally the hospital would like to consider applications either
before admission or during the stay for two reasons. First, it is re-
quired by law (eligibiity should be determined before the rendering of
services except in emergencies), and second, early consideration permits
monit6ring of free care cases more closely while in the hospital.
Monitoring rarely happens for several reasons: few people know about
free care to apply for it ahead of admission; the length of stay is too
short; emergency admissions are admitted without financial information
and hence do not enter into the application process until either the
patient is well into his or her stay or already discharged; and many
admissions appear to have coverage and when checked into actually do not.
The invalidity is not discoverd until after admission (for Blue Cross
policy holders) or long after discharge for all others (private in-
surance companies, Medicaid, Medicare, and self-paying patients). And
finally, people for no apparent reason slip through the admitting desk
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screen. This lag time is very costly for the hospital. It requires
excessive paperwork, and results in avoidable debts (for elective admis-
sions only).
In addition to the legal reasons for wanting to identify indigents
before providing services, the hospital would like to monitor the cases
of free care recipients. Ideally, this would ensure that all services
rendered would be necessary expenditures for the hospital, but not affect
6
the quality of care received. Given that the preadmissions are a small
percentage of the total recipients of free care (about 13%) and that
presently there is no special monitoring of these cases, this form of
"tightening up" is overly optimistic. This example illustrates the on-
going problem of the quality assurance program in most hospitals--the
incentives for the hospital simply are in direct conflict with the PSRO's
and quality assurance. To compound this problem, these programs have
very little clout with physicians and generally have limited impact on
altering behavior except in infrequent, blatant cases.
Persistent Inaccessibility
It is important to note that no matter how long the dunning cycle
is, once the patient is past the admitting desk, dissemination of the
information about the availability of free care is totally dependent on
the patient's initiative. If the patient does not mention that he or she
cannot pay the bill, there is no way to identify potentially eligible
patients. From the growing size of bad debts, it is very possible that
potentially eligible individuals are not aware of the availability of
6 For example, free care patients could be excluded from testing
done for education purposes by the house staff.
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free care and do not ever enter the free care process.
This 'complaint about the lack of information is common. Although
the Massachusetts regulations as amended in February 1976 require that the
first emergency bill have a notice indicating the availability of Hill-
Burton uncompensated services, most hospitals do not comply with this
requirement and it is not presently enforced by the State Office. Such
a notice could significantly improve the knowledge and accessibility of
uncompensated services. From the hospital perspective, increased access
is more costly and would have serious financial implications for the rate
of increase in the hospital losses. Losses are of grave importance to
the hospital which experienced its first deficit last year in over 20
years. I am certain that this hospital, like many hospitals, will not
comply with this regulation until it absolutely has to, i.e., when the
costs of non-compliance outweigh the costs of providing free care either
in terms of dollars, jeopardizing Certificate of Need application,
publicity, or delicensure. One can only wonder why such an easily ad-
ministered enforcement has not been done by the state, assuming an
honest concern for accessibility.
The Eligibility Guidelines
The guidelines which the Free Care Committee follows were outlined
previously. There are several points worth making about these criteria.
First, the Committee's guidelines are more lenient than required by law.
The Massachusetts Regulations defining eligibility criteria ($4,000 and
$600 per dependent for income and $1,000 of assets and up to $2,000
assets in the case of a married couple) were adopted by the FCC and
approved by the Board of Trustees on March 26, 1975. These policies
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were in effect for almost three years, and in February 1978 new eligibility
criteria were developed and agreed upon. These new criteria were more
lenient: $5,000 income plus $1,000 per dependent and $2,000 personal
assets plus $1,000 for a spouse and $500 per dependent. There are several
possible explanations for this.
First, the FCC's composition probably favors more lenient criteria
than those set by only financial administrators. The guidelines are
partly derived from the poverty line guidelines which have higher income
cutoffs. Second, the Board may have seen this generosity as an important
gesture to make to the community. Third, the hospital is not an urban
hospital per se and its service area (Cambridge, Somerville, Arlington,
Watertown, Lexington, and Belmont), while having numerous pockets of
poverty is not a poor area generally. This situation may have influenced
the guidelines' upper limits. Fourth, the guidelines set by the state
were over three years old and inflation combined with the escalated costs
of medical care may have warranted a reasonable increase. Last, many
members of the FCC mentioned that they were disgusted with the minimal
allowances given by the state and wanted to make their guidelines more
realistic and reasonable.
The eligiibilty criteria are less flexible with respect to service
area and students than income. By limiting its service area to six towns
the hospital has significantly reduced the number of potentially eligible
persons and successfully excluded large poor sections of Boston. The
administrator responsible for deciding the service area at the time of
applying for Hill-Burton funds must have had considerable foresight (or
luck) in strictly defining its service area as such and not including
"greater Boston vicinity" as many other hospitals did. These other
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hospitals currently must provide uncompensated services for the majority
of metropolitan Boston.
Similarly, the hospital has excluded students who are not perma-
nent residents of the service area. Given the composition of Cambridge,
this has excluded a large number of the low-income persons who otherwise
would be potentially eligible. Some of the hospital staff I interviewed
criticized the exclusion of students, saying that the hospital should
accept the community composition as given but this position has not been
formally presented to the FCC.
While the guidelines may appear rather straightforward and easy
to apply, they actually permit the exercise of a considerable amount of
discretion. For example, work potential can be a criterion used for
assessing an applicant. The weight that is attached to this criterion
varies considerably from case to case depending on many circumstances.
In some cases, the weighting appears to reflect the Committee's attitude
towards an individual's lifestyle. The FCC is sensitive to this issue
and tries not to be too judgemental but the distinctions between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable unemployment or underemployment are difficult
ones to make.
The service area as defined also appears more straightforward than
it actually is in practice. Although its use in limiting the amount of
free care provided to non-emergency admissions has increased, exceptions
are still made. Such factors as location of relatives, past residencies,
and past hospitalization at the hospital are sometimes used to waive this
criterion.
Finally, considerable judgement is required in determining that
services rendered are truely medically necessary. This is clear-cut in
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some cases but certainly questionable in others, especially when the
patient suffers from psychological problems. Although the FCC does
include people who have sophisticated knowledge it does not have a
physician who regularly attends meetings. The FCC has debated including
a physician in its composition but has decided against it, arguing that
the physician would often be asked to review work of his peers. Such
peer review may result in too much pressure on the individual. However,
the arguments for a physician are convincing--he would improve their
ability to discern "medically necessary" services and would improve the
committee's impact on quality assurance of care rendered.
The Free Care Committee
By law, the Free Care Committee (FCC) can determine eligibility
for either free care or reduced costs. Some people have found the name
of the committee misleading inferring that approvals will mean free care,
not reduced cost care. When challenged, individuals from the FCC argued
that "Uncompensated Services Committee" or "Hill-Burton Committee" does
not easily convey its purpose and may discourage applicants. Regardless
of its title, the FCC has rendered reduced cost services to a small
proportion of inpatient applicants (9% in Fiscal Year 1978 and 13% in
Fiscal Year 1977). These decisions are made in the following way: the
amount of income the individual is over the guidelines is subtracted
from the total amount of the bill. If there is a positive difference
the person receives that amount as free care. For example, suppose an
individual with dependents is allowed an income of $10,000, yet he or
she makes $11,000. The bill has amounted to $2,400. The $1,000 dif-
ference between the actual income and the individual's income is put
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towards the payment of the account. This person would therefore owe
$1,000 while the hospital would supply $1,400 of free care.
The small proportion of reduced cost care is only partially
explained by this methodology--that is, income over an individual's
allotment may pay for the hospital bills in most cases. An additional
explanation is that the FCC until about one and a half years ago was
very liberal in its dispensing of free care. If an individual was in-
digent, chances were the total hospital bill would be covered.
In my interviews, the outpatient accounts maanger was criticized
by some hospital staff for not awarding any reduced cost care. While
the average size of the bill is generally small, the critics claim that
there are borderline individuals who are rejected from total free care yet
should receive reduced cost care. Given the average size of the bills
and the financial pressure the manager must feel, this may be the easiest
policy for him to administer. He simply approves clear-cut cases and
avoids the substantive issues raised by borderline cases.
* Besides reduced cost or total free care, the FCC has the power to
make unofficial decisions such as deferred payments. This option is used
for potential workers who are only temporarily out of the job market.
The FCC may delay billing until a job is resumed or permit installment
payments, thereby spreading the bill over one or more years. The accounts
managers are agreeable to this arrangement because they would much rather
get a small monthly check than put the bill into bad debts.
Another option used by the FCC is to ignore an account and let it
These critical remarks came from within a unit of the hospital
which is currently experiencing low census and may be losing patients
to other hospitals which have better "deals.". Their concern for their
own viability may in fact be coloring their perception of the FCC decisions.
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go bad without sending it to a collection agency. This strategy gives the
individual tree care, while the hospital incurs bad debt (rather than
counting it as free care, which has a lower reimbursement rate), yet the
individual does not receive a bad credit rating in the process. This
approach is used for individuals who are unemployed but previously held
good jobs, have assets which are tied up, and have a good credit rating
which would significantly harm their current financial situation. The
account is ignored and no one loses in the process, since the hospital
could not have collected on the account in any event.
One final action which the FCC can take is contacting the patient's
physician about reducing the physician fees included in the medical bill.
8
This is only done with the individual's permission since otherwise a
patient's pride or relationship with his or her physician may be damaged
in the process. Upon consent, usually a social service worker will con-
tact the physician and simply inform the doctor that the hospital is
providing free care. The social worker may then ask if the doctor could
at least reduce the fee and generally the doctor agrees to also provide
free care.
One interesting and counterintuitive finding is that the FCC is
much more likely to approve free care for a large hospital bill than for
a small one. Their rationale is that a small bill can be more easily
budget paid or deferred and covered by the individual. A large bill is
more likely to end up as an uncollectable or produce unreasonable finan-
cial burdens and therefore should be covered by the hospital. Moreover,
8 Free care includes hospital costs and ancillary charges, and
does not cover physician fees.
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large bills generally mean that the individual has gone through a more
traumatic me'dical experience, which the FCC would like to minimize.
The four options (deferred payment, installment plans, ignoring
the bill but not sending it to a collection agency, and attempting to
get free care for the physician fees) are discretionary decisions which
the FCC has used in the past to respond to individual cases. In summary,
each case warrants a close examination of its circumstances and appropri-
ate action is then taken. These adjustments teWect 'e- cynejy, v hle-E
the FCC--it is flexible, it treats each case individually, and it has a
genuine concern for the patients involved.
OUTCOMES OF THE PROCESS
How have the application process and the set of eligibility
criteria affected implementation of the Hill-Burton regulations? Figure 2
shows the overall percentage and number of applications which were ac-
cepted for either free or reduced cost care since February 1976. Figure 3
displdys the breakdown of the decisions made by the Free Care Committee
since February 1976. Acceptances for total free care and partial pay
(reduced cost care) are shown separately. Denials are categorized into
several groups: work potential; outside service area; not a permanent
resident; over income; and other. Figure 4 further analyzes denials.
It depicts the total percentage of the applications which were denied
and then subdivides this percentage according to the reason for denial.
At first, the acceptance rate of applications was very high and
the only rejections were due to "other reasons," usually incomplete
applications (see Figures 3 and 4). It was not until December 1976 that
anyone was rejected due to ineligibility and then for the next year only
Figure 2. Percent and Number of Applications Accepted 3/76 - 3/79
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Figure 4. Percent u Denials Made By the Free Care Committee
Percentage Broken Down According to Reason
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"over income" was used to reject applications. The other criterion,
"service areA," was not used to reject patients, even though through 1976
and 1977 the FCC did approve free care to patients who resided outside
the service area (see Table 1). It was not until January 1978, one month
before new FCC procedures and policies were adopted, that other reasons
began to rule out applicants. Service area was particularly used, al-
though not being a permanent resident and work potential of the patient
were also included. Recently, work potential has increasingly dis-
qualified several individuals.
Limitations of the Data
Any discussion of data must begin with a few qualifiers to outline
some of the problems with using simple statistics. First, Figures 3 and 4
categorize the denials according to the reasons stated in the minutes of
the FCC meeting. It is unknown what degree of consistency there is in
the listing of these reasons. The first reason listed may not always be
the most important. Second, the category of "other reasons" included
applications which were denied due to their incompletion. These may have
been completed and resubmitted, and it is unclear if these are included
in the records. Third, none of the records include any of the informal
forms of decisions which the FCC makes, as described earlier. Last,
records, while conscientiously kept, are subject to considerable sources
of error.9
9 For example, in the Hill-Burton annual report in 1977 the number
of accepted applicants is not consistent from one page to another.
TABLE 1.- ACCEPTED APPLICATIONS FROM INSIDE AND OUTSIDE SERVICE AREA,
Fiscal Year 1976 - Present.
Fiscal 1976
Inside Outs ide
Fiscal 1977
Inside Outs ide
Fiscal 1978
Ins ide Outs ide
Fiscal 1979
Ins ide Outsi de
21
25
15
20
17
Percentage outside the Service Area, by Quarter
1st
FY 1976
FY 1977
FY 1978
FY 1979
2nd
14
41
15
16
3rd
19
32
24
4th
24
32
18
Month
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Increase in Applications
The number of applicants and recipients of free care is increasing.
In FY 1976, 155 persons received free care; in FY 1977 the number went up
to 466, and in FY 1978 it was 1,997. The number of applicants accepted
per month is depicted in Figure 2. There are several reasons for this
upward trend. For one, the availabiity of free care was more clearly
posted within the hospital and printed notices in the local newspaper
may have increased community awareness. Last summer, the regulation
requiring visible and translated signs in numerous locations was enforced
by the Attorney General's Office and this may have resulted in an increase
in applications. In addition, the admitting desk began checking for in-
surance information and immediately giving out applications in their
admissions process and this significantly improved patient awareness of
the program.
Second, there have been substantial cutbacks in Medicaid 04 General
Relief funding, which increases the potential eligible population. This
decrease in other governmental program benefits has forced the hospital
to absorb the costs of providing free care. Essentially, this represents
a redistribution of costs from the general public to paying patients
hospitalized at this facility.
Third, the revision of the policies and procedures (adopted in
February 1978) significantly changed the free care application process.
The old policies and procedures were less accessible to applicants in the
following ways:
- free care application forms were located in one office
and applications were not given out at the admissions
desk;
- this office was only open during normal business hours
(not in the evenings or on the weekends);
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- the posted signs advertising free care were fairly cryptic;
- the applications were supposed to be filed within three
days of the receipt of services.
The present policies have been improved greatly. Applications are avail-
able and can be returned at numerous offices throughout the hospital, in-
cluding the admitting room, ambulatory care offices, patient accounts,
and social services. The policy of asking for applications within three
days has been dropped either because it was unfair or unrealistic. The
signs are much more coherent and explicit about the availability of free
care. (A copy of the present posted text is found in Appendix B.)
Last, the number of applicants for free care coincides with two
recent development in the attitudes and behavior of the general public
towards health care. The first is the dramatic growth in the utilization
of outpatient services. Apparently, these services are now replacing
doctor visits, especially for lower income persons. The huge rise in
outpatients applying and receiving free care is in part due to the expan-
sion of both the women's clinic and outpatient psychiatry services. The
second trend is the increasing acceptance of the attitude that health
care is a right and not a privilege. This observation is probably more
applicable to outpatient visits, since most inpatient applicants were
acute or emergency admissions (only about 11% of inpatient recipients
are pre-admission determined).
Figure 2 also illustrates that although the acceptance process
appears to be more strict, in general the number of applicants receiving
free or reduced cost care has increased. This is in large part due to
the greater volume of applicants, particular outpatient.
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Monthly Variations
The second point that should be made about this data is that the
number of applications fluctuates considerably each month. For instance,
in Figure 4, the considerable dip in accepted applications in January
1978 is mainly due to the large number of applications in that month that
were over income and outside the service area. Similarly, back in 1976
and 1977, most of the rejections were generally dependent on the number
of incomplete applications. This stochastic nature makes it difficult to
project the trends in the FCC decisions, since their decisions are often
a direct function of the actual applicants. Moreover, we do not know if
the application pool has changed or if the FCC, in fact, applied different
criteria.
Impacts of the New Policies
The revised policies and procedures appear to have had a signifi-
cant impact upon the Free Care Committee decisions. Once these new poli-
cies iwere adopted (February 1978) the decisions to reject applicants were
based on a variety of reasons. The concept of work potential was intro-
duced, and although not significant until recent months, represents a
new departure for the FCC. Work potential allows the FCC the right to
base decisions on a patient's potential or past lifestyle and provides
ample opportunity for the FCC to abuse this policy. The FCC realizes
this danger and honestly tries to exclude personal values of committee
members from their decisions. However, just the fact of its existence
implicitly indicates a trend towards "tightening up" the allocation of
free care.
Figure 4 indicates that "outside service area" has also been used
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more strictly since January 1978. Table 1 supports this trend, at least
when 1978 and 1979 figures are compared with 1977 figures. This require-
ment is somewhat more difficult to enforce due to: 1) emergencies and
acute admissions regardless of residence; 2) a person may have a past
connection with the hospital in which case the rules are bent; and 3)
a patient may normally visit Dr. X who works out of the hospital--
therefore the rule is not strictly enforced.
Although the new policies and procedures have increased the variety
of reasons for denial and reduced the percentage of applications accepted
by the Free Care Committee, they have had no impact on the overall number
of acceptances and dollar amount given out. This is due to the large
volume of applications which are processed by the outpatients accounts
manager alone.10 Because the proportion of the total number of applicants
which he processes for free care is increasing, stricter policies on the
11
part of the FCC have not reduced the overall acceptance rate.
Although obviously influenced by policies adopted by the FCC, the
accounts manager still makes a majority of the decisions regarding free
care. Therefore, despite stricter policies and the fact that the FCC is
"tightening up" and rejecting a larger proportion of their applicants,
it has not reduced the overall percentage of the total number of appli-
cants receiving care. This discussion refers to the number of applicants;
10 The outpatient accounts manager can approve applications for
accounts under $100. Because the majority of his accounts are under $100
and outpatient accounts constitute over 85% (FY 1978) of the free care
patients, the outpatient accounts manager effectively controls the majority
of the total number of applications.
11 One other possible explanation is that the outpatient accounts
manager is becoming more lenient than in the past, which certain inter-
viewees indicated.
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in terms of the dollar amount of care given out the FCC has probably had
a more significant impact since inpatient accounts are much larger (in
FY 1978, the average inpatient bill receiving some kind of free care was
$1,652, while the outpatient bill was $43).
The Summary Statistics
Table 2 summarizes the hospital outputs regarding compliance with
the Hill-Burton regulations. The total amount of free care given (both
in terms of dollars and patients), the number of applications denied, the
average amount of free care received, and the amount of free care awarded
by quarter are displayed for FY 1977 and FY 1978. This data (with all of
its problems) indicates numerous trends:
1) The amount of free care awarded annually is increasing
(even accounting for inflation of around 7%).
2) The number of applicants applying and being accepted for
free care is increasing. This is almost exclusively due
to the increase in outpatient visits, previously mentioned.
3) The number of individuals receiving reduced cost care is
decreasing. This is probably, again, due to the number
outpatient visits, which do not receive reduced cost care,
generally because the size of the bill is small.
4) The number of prior determinations of eligibility is de-
creasing.
5) The average amount of assistance is decreasing due to the
dramatic increase in outpatient visits and the reduction
in the average size of the bill. The average inpatient
assistance also decreased during this period.
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TABLE 2. SUMARY STATISTICS ON THE PROVISION OF FREE CARE,
Fiscal Years 1977 and 19781
Fiscal 1977 Fiscal 19782
Applications for Free Care
Total received
Accepted
Free care
Reduced cost
Denied
Prior determination made
Inpatient
Outpatient
Number of Patients
Total number
Inpatient
Free care
Reduced cost
Outpatient
Free care
Reduced cost
Total Dollar Amount Provided
. Inpatient
12.1 3Free care
Reduced cost
12.2 Free care
Reduced cost
Outpatient
12.1 Free care
Reduced cost
12.2 Free care
Reduced cost
$394,728.04
342,180.00
299.852.56
13,581.58
0.00
28,745.89
52,548.94
52,548.94
0.00
0.00
0.00
1 Figures are compiled from the annual compliance report filed by
the hospital.
2 For comparison with Fiscal Year 1977, charges (not costs) are used.
12.1 clause refers to care provided to individuals with income
under $5,000. 12.2 clause refers to individuals who earn over $5,000.
544
462
432
30
82
(85%)
(15%)
2,143
1,997
1,977
20
146
(93%)
( 7%)
23 (12%)
90 (32%)
24 (11%)
177 (10%)
476
198
163
35
278
278
0
(42%)
(58%)
1,997
228
208
20
1,769
1,769
0
(11%)
(89%)
(87%)
(13%)
$453,372.
376,733.
331,525.
15,069.
0.
30,139.
76,639.
76,639.
0.
0.
0.
(83%)
(17%)
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS ON THE PROVISION OF FREE CARE, continued.
Fiscal 1977 Fiscal 1978
Average Amount of Assistance
Total average
Inpatient average
Free care
Reduced cost
Outpatient average
$ 829.
1,728.
1,840.
1,209.
189.
Amount of Care Given Out, by Quarter
(% of the Annual Total)
Dollar
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Number
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Amount
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
of Patients
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
12%
16
34
38
$ 227.
1,652.
1,594..
2,260.
43.
28%
10
29
33
27
27
23
23
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6) The hypothesis that the amount of free care (either in
terms of the number of individuals receiving free care
or in the dollar amounts) declines in the later half of
the year, due to pressure mounting on the FCC to keep
the amount low and the knowledge of how much care has
been given out already for the fiscal year, is rejected.
The quarterly figures do not support this reasoning.
7) It appears that the FCC adheres to its policy about
reducing the cost of care to individuals over income.
That is, over income individuals do not receive free
care but rather have their bill reduced by that amount
by which they are over income. This presumes that any
amount of "excess" income is available to go towards the
hospital bill.
Impact of Free Care on Hospital Losses
* Figure 5 displays the amount of bad debt and free care for 1974-
1978, and provokes only one comment: while it is true that free care is
increasing, this cannot be used to explain the enormous increases in the
bad debts. The chief administrator has implicitly told the hospital
staff that the growth in the bad debt is attributable to the increasing
amount of free care given out. The statistics do not support this accusa-
tion--the hospital losses are rising too fast to be solely due to the
provision of free care. It may be that although the chief administrator
knows this, it is one of the few leverage points he has without interfer-
ing with the medical staff or the board of directors.
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Figure 5. Hospital Losses
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Impact on Accessibility
By law, the hospital cannot refuse admission to any individual on
the basis of race, creed, color, third party payor, ability to pay.12
This requirement appears to be carefully observed by the hospital, except
for elective admissions (when the hospital may require a deposit if in-
surance coverage is not evident). In theory, the Hill-Burton was to im-
prove access to hospitals. However, it appears that the experience has
not significantly increased accessibility. The social workers mentioned
that the availability of free care did ease the burdens of many patients
and induce a few individuals to receive care who otherwise would have
been too proud to have come to the hospital. Given the public's ignorance
about Hill-Burton, the individuals who were actually induced to receive
care must be limited. In addition, the number of preadmission determina-
tions of eligibility (10% each for inpatient and outpatient visits which
received free care) is small, inferring that those who came to the hospi-
tal generally would have come regardless of the financial circumstances.
For acute admissions I would conclude that care is no more acces-
sible than before Hill-Burton, although it eases financial burdens and
for this reason is very important. The experience for outpatient visits
is significantly different, however. The number of outpatient visits
receiving care is rapidly increasing, particularly due to the expansion
of the outpatient clinics. These two departments are known to the finan-
cial administrators as "losers" and actually were advertised in The Real
Paper as "bargains." The outpatient accounts manager is certain that
word is getting around that this hospital will provide free care and that
12 This is specified in the Community Service requirement of the
Hill-Burton Act.
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they are receiving patients who come specifically for this reason. In
terms of numbers of patients this care is probably becoming more acces-
sible due to the large number of outpatient visits which receive free
care (over 1,700 per year). As in the past, the emergency or acute
patient is admitted with relatively few questions asked, care is ren-
dered, and the issue of financing comes up after the fact. This process
has not been altered (except to hand out a free care application when
insurance coverage is lacking) and therefore cannot claim to be more
accessible.
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CHAPTER THREE
A
THE IMPACT OF THE REGULATION ON THE HOSPITAL
The previous chapter described the application process for free
care, the eligibility criteria, and the decision-making process. This
process was then analyzed in terms of the timing required for the approval
of care, its failures to improve accessibility, and the discretion and
leniency of the criteria and the Free Care Committee. Finally, the out-
comes of the process were outlined, i.e. what kinds of decisions were
actually made and how did these affect the financial status of the
hospital and the accessibility of both inpatient and outpatient care.
The outcomes described in Chapter Two do not fully explain the
effects which the regulation has had on the hospital. The regulation
has affected many of the hospital staff and their jobs. This chapter
takes the analysis of the regulation one step further to focus on the
impacts of the regulation on the organization. Before the regulation,
there'were hospital staff doing their respective jobs, responding to
various incentives. How did the regulation change the jobs and the in-
centive systems at work? In analyzing the effects on the organization,
the long-term impacts and success of the regulation can be fully
evaluated.
The organization of this chapter follows its logical argument.
The first section describes the informal goals of the actors in the free
care decision-making process. These goals circumscribe the major con-
cerns of the various actors and help to explain the impacts of the
regulation on them, also outlined. However, these goals only go so far
in explaining the unexpected behavior of the Free Care Committee. Two
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elements. are useful in completing the explanation: 1) the incentives
which the various actors respond to; and 2) the organizational norms of
the FCC. Finally, due to the numerous goals in operation, the incentive
systems, and the norms of the FCC, the Hill-Burton regulation has had
unintended consequences. These consequences are analyzed as to whether
they are functional or dysfunctional according to the original objectives
of the regulation. In the end, we will see that the sub-organizational
goals and needs are very powerful and can, in fact, have goals which
diverge from those of the main organization. Therefore, in order to
ensure maximum effectiveness at the policy level, it may be necessary to
translate these sub-organizational goals into incentives to modify their
behavior and thereby change the overall organizational responses to the
imposed regulation.
The Goals of the Major Actors in the Free Care Process
The key actors in the free care process each have their own set of
goals and purposes which delineate the actions that they can and will take.
In this sense, many actions and decisions are predictable and are limited
in their scope. Below, the goals of the major actors in the decision-
making process for free care are summarized. These goals were surmised
from the numerous interviews I conducted.
Patient Accounts and Fiscal Officers. Their sole purpose is to
ensure the financial viability of the hospital and to minimize losses.
This may induce the accountants to minimize the amount of free care
given out and increase bad debts due to the higher reimbursement rate
for bad debts. Ideally, the patient accountants want to have complete
information about any account because uncertainty is very costly. This
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preference for settled accounts may counteract the financial preference
for bad debts, since establishing which accounts will receive free care
reduces the uncertainty and its related costs.
Social Services. Their primary objective is to provide high
quality social services in the form of eligibility for government pro-
grams, continued care, and provision of free care. They also try to
ensure that all eligibles apply for free care and that all legitimate
applicants receive free care.
Administration. The main goal of the Chief Executive Officer is
the perpetuation of the hospital and its reputation. This necessitates
a constant concern for hospital losses which threaten the fiscal integrity
of the budget. Therefore, he would prefer providing a minimally accept-
able amount of free care and limit the risk of his institution. In many
ways, his perspective is probably the most utilitarian in that he sees
managing the hospital as many business people see running businesses,
given the distinct characteristics of hospitals. Knowing about last
year's deficit, he tries to pressure those who make decisions about free
care to minimize their awards.
The Physicians. The doctors have one chief purpose--to provide
the best medical care they can, irregardless of cost. This position is
supported by their profession and efforts to instill a sense of cost
consciousness are slow to have a noticeable impact on the physician's
behavior. Thus, the doctors are generally unconcerned about the finan-
cial aspects of the delivery of care. Indeed, most physicians are ig-
norant of how the hospital care delivered to indigents is paid for.
The Board of Trustees. The greatest concern of the Board is the
permanence and viability of the institution and this directly translates
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into fiscal responsibility. Given the small (miniscule) impact of free
care on the hospital budget, their interest in negligible.
Thus, there are two major goals in opposition, each with its own
support. On the one hand, fiscal responsibility is central to the values
and roles of the patient accounts managers, the fiscal officers, the
administration, and the Board of Trustees. On the other hand, the physi-
cians and social service workers are primarily concerned with providing
quality care. Given this brief outline of the general goals of the key
actors, let us now turn to the actual impacts of the regulation.
Impacts of the Regulation on the Key Actors
How were the vaious actors in the free care process affected by
the provision of uncompensated services? To what extent did their goals
shape the actions that each actor took? Several actors are analyzed in
this section to explain the actions taken and the outcomes of the free
care application process.
The Admitting Desk. The provision of free care has probably had
the most significant impact on the workers at the admitting desk, at least
in altering their daily routine. The desk is now required to complete
the cover sheet of the medical record, check for insurance coverage, and
if there is none, it is instructed to hand out free care applications.
Depending on the time of day, the interviewer at the admitting desk may
help the patient fill out the form, answer any questions or explain the
application process. The consistency with which this is done is
questionable, particularly given the large number of applicants who slip
through the process. The admitting desk is a crucial source of informa-
tion about the free care program; it is probably the most important poten-
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tial contact for an ignorant patient. This responsibility has forced the
admitting desk to ask more questions of admitted patients and to be more
aware of the financial arrangements of the admissions. Given the his-
torical predisposition of the hospital to serving a middle class popula-
tion and not to inquire about such issues, this is a major change in
their orientation.
The Social Service Workers. With the implementation of free care
services, the social services workers have had much more work to do be-
sides planning for discharges and continuing care. The delivery of free
care has increased patient contacts and diversified the types of patients
which the social service department handles. This new type of patient
(simply poor, not chronically ill or elderly) may give the workers a
different sense of reward since their work efforts have immediate and
final payoffs--sick people are treated, get discharged, and yet do not
incur financial burdens.
In addition, the free care program has expanded the responsibili-
ties of social service workers to include working with many different
groups. The department not only identifies and processes free care
applicants, but it also investigates alternative government program
options for which the applicant may be eligible. This role as a liaison
between the hospital and outside agencies increases their contacts and
knowledge about outside reousrces and issues. By increasing the social
services provided, improving the worker's knowledge, and locating alter-
native funding (thereby saving the hospital money), the worker has many
more opportunities for self-satisfaction. The social service department
also has an increased responsibility at the Free Care Committee meetings
for presenting cases which they are working on. This responsibility
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gives them considerable power in affecting the outcome of the FCC decision.
Last, the workers often negotiate the reduction or elimination of doctor
bills with physicians. These responsibilities, while offering many op-
portunities for significant benefits, also impose some costs to the
workers. For example, contacting a physician about the reduction of a
patient bill may not be rewarding in itself, but does improve the workers'
access to the physician in other contexts, and therefore can be beneficial.
The Patient Accounts Managers. The workload of the patient ac-
counts managers has increased substantially with the provision of free
care; the equivalent of two full-time people are required to administer
the program. But this work does not go unrewarded. The patient accounts
managers present all cases to the FCC, except those currently being worked
on by social services for alternative funding, and can heavily influence
the FCC decisions with their impressions. The job also is very rewarding
in the personal satisfaction gained by helping indigents. This process
has made the accounts managers much more sympathetic to indigents and
more patient oriented. In addition, it has made them more aware of the
multi-faceted aspects of health care delivery problems, an outcome that
is particularly valuable for fiscal officers whose training probably did
not emphasize this approach. At the same time, however, the accounts
mapagers have become collectively more skeptical of two actors in this
process: physicians and the government. Some accounts managers did not
appreciate the entrepreneurial nature of medical practice until they had
to address the social problems created by large physician fees. Similarly,
intimate knowledge of a federal regulatory program 1) made them doubt the
government's ability to implement any program fairly, 2) created resent-
ment about the state's change in the rules of the program after the
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fact, and 3) disapproved of the state's cutbacks in government program
benefits whilch directly increase their role as a welfare provider.1
The Physicians. The impact on physicians is more difficult to
assess because physicians fall into two categories--those who have heard
about free care and those who have not. Although the chief administrator
has sent around a memo to the physicians informing them about the avail-
ability of free care, many physicians do not know of its existence. This
significantly affects the medical staff's ability to serve as a source of
information for potentially eligible patients. Despite the overal igno-
rance about the free care program, the regulation has had two indirect
effects on changing physician attitudes. First, the overall conscious-
ness about medical costs is increasing, in part due to the contact of the
social workers with physicians about reducing the cost of the doctor
fees. Often times the physicians will not have realized the total cost
of the treatment. Whether this awareness gets translated into modified
physician behavior is open to debate. Second, treating indigents with
no compensation can, and has, created a backlash of physicians who refuse
to treat any patients who cannot pay cash. In addition, these physicians
have self selected themselves out of emergency room duty to eliminate
their chances of having to take indigents, thereby reducing the number
of physicians on call to serve in emergencies.
One physician told me that he knew a fellow doctor was telling his
patients to come specifically to Prescott Hospital because of the free
care policies. He felt this was taking advantage of the hospital. I am
not sure how this "takes advantage" of the hospital if the patients were
1 For example, the cutback in Medicaid 04 General Relief in 1975.
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truly medically indigent. This seems to be an indication of how well the
hospital is doing its job relative to other facilities.
At a more theoretical and long term level, the availability of
free care could reduce the power of the physicians by having their prac-
tice scrutinized by Quality Assurance or the FCC for patients who are
receiving free care. Although presently ineffective, this surveillance
could create pressure to ensure the provision of cost-effective hospital
services. Moreover, the FCC can and sometimes does question "medically
necessary" or the appropriateness of certain procedures and length of
stay. For the present, however, because 1) many patients have not ap-
plied for free care before they are discharged, and 2) most physicians
are unaware of the availability of free care, it is difficult for the
regulation to affect the behavior of physicians.
In addition to these two constraints on affecting physician
behavior, there is an overriding professional bias against using economic
rationales to determine medical decisions. In general, physicians' pri-
mary concern, as professionally prescribed and constantly reinforced, is
quality medicine, not cost-effective practice. This attitude is slowly
changing as the younger physicians are slightly more aware of issues of
cost. To underscore the difficulty of influencing physicians to provide
cost-effective care, it is worth noting that the chief of medicine will
not speak out on the issue of providing free or reduced cost care--this
would be interfering with the physicians' practices. Such notions of
independence and professionalism are very strong and severly limit the
impact that any free care regulations might have on physician behavior.
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Absolutely no visions of
"charity" or "community service" are conjured up with the mention of
-74-
:free care to the CEO, only skept'icism and resentment. The CEO is
very skeptical about government's ability to implement fair and reason-
able program, and this is only worsened by his experience with Hill-
Burton. He resents having the terms of a loan changed midway through
the payback period and this lack of trust seems to pervade this impres-
sions about any government regulation.
The delivery of free care has also threatened his most important
goal--the financial security of his institution. He has let his growing
concern be known at general staff meetings and has implied that much of
the loss is attributable to the provision of free care. Realistically,
to harp on free care would be inappropriate given the amount provided
versus the size of the bad debts. However, it may be one of his few
points where he feels he has any control and tries to use this to its
fullest extent. Although when examining his influence in trying to
reduce hospital losses, statistics do not indicate much success.2 This
lack of effectiveness may serve to emphasize his vulnerability and lack
of cofitrol over the dominant forces shaping the financial picture of
his institution.
The Board of Trustees. Much to my surprise, the Board is only
minimally affected or interested in the provision of free care. Apparent-
ly, this board is not very community oriented. Thus, the Board does not
choose to advertise its goodwill to the community and does not play up
its public relations. (It probably does not have to sell "charity," just
good health care.) Therefore, free care is of minimal interest to the
Board since it constitutes only a minor fraction of the annual budget
2 See Figure 5. The amounts of free care and bad debts are both
increasing.
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(about 1%). The board members I interviewed thought the amount was
"trivial" and probably should be larger. They also felt that they should
spend their time worrying about the real money losers and sources of
loss. This disinterest is reflected in the fact that this topic came up
maybe twice last year and was never discussed separately but under the
heading of "uncollectables." The only other effect that free care may
have had is that the Board quietly appreciates the relatively nearby
urban hospital which acts as a buffer for this hospital--they know that
without this other institution demand for free care at their hospital
would be several times greater.
The Free Care Committee Members. The Hill-Burton has affected the
members of the FCC in several ways. The provision of free care and the
FCC meetings have improved the individuals' senses of accomplishment and
productivity. This has spillovers into other, unrelated working relation-
ships with the member departments and has improved their ability to com-
municate and get other jobs done--"it greases the wheels," someone said.
In addition, by having members from a cross-section of departments, the
FCC meetings often digress into a forum for discussion of general health
care issues and greatly improves communication with other departments.
Lastly, the provision of free care improves the hospital's accountability
(it has a better sense of where its losses are) and allows the hospital to
take some credit for the public services that it does provide in the form
of free care.
Given the prevailing cost consciousness of the administration, it
is surprising that the FCC has developed such lenient (and patient-ori-
ented) policies and can derive such satisfaction from administering this
regulation. While the goals of the various actors help in explaining
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some of their actions, they do not capture all of the dynamics. What is
missing from* this explanation is an analysis of the incentive systems to
which the various actors respond. In addition, if the committee members
come from various departments each with their own set of goals, how is it
that the FCC can overlook many fundamental differences and operate in
such a productive and consensual way? The examination of these two issues
is important in understanding how free care actually gets decided and the
way in which the regulation has affected the inner workings of the organi-
zation.
Incentives
The two basic incentives which aid in explaining the behavior of
the actors involved in free care decision-making include solidary and
purposive incentives. These incentives result in a high degree of cohe-
sion between certain groups within the organization, whose goals are
otherwise incompatible. Solidary incentives are intangible rewards de-
rived from associating with the other members involved, such as socializ-
ing, sense of group membership, and identification. This status is
achieved regardless of the precise ends of the association. For example,
several members of the Free Care Committee talked to me about how much
they enjoyed the meetings themselves--they were "fun" and the "best
committee in the hospital." Indeed, their meeting reflected this in the
socializing beforehand, the story-telling, and the general sense of com-
raderie. It was clear that the members, regardless of their beliefs in
the purpose of the committee, enjoyed the association.
This section is based on the categorization outlined in Peter B.
Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 6, September 1961, pp. 129-166.
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The other relevant incentives are purposive. These are intangible
incentives which are related to the stated ends of the association. The
members of the committee do not personally benefit from their actions but
are induced to expend their personal energies because they believe in the
function they are performing--it is a good and worthy cause. All of the
committee members interviewed mentioned how satisfying the FCC meetings
were for this reason. In fact, to underline their sense of purpose,
"thank you" letters from individuals having received free care are read
aloud at meetings. This and other forms of acknowledgements occur
frequently.
The self-satisfaction and sense of success that the committee
members feel are explained by the solidary and purposive incentives pro-
vided by the committee. Although not formally acknowledged by any group
(either within the hospital or in the community) or rewarded materially,
these two incentives are strong and promote a sense of commitment to
providing free care in the best possible manner. In addition, for mem-
bers of the committee who do not have much patient contact, the relation-
ships with patients provided through committee work are valued. Perhaps,
upon coming to the hospital certain workers may have been slightly dis-
appointed with the utilitarian aspects of the hospital (which, in many
ways, is run like a business) and the FCC may be an important vehicle for
them to feel like they are doing something which has broader social im-
plications than, say, the perpetuation of the institution. In Schein's
terms, it may be a re-establishment of a psychological contract that may
have been violated with the ordinary tasks of their job. 4
Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Psychology (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 45.
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The Free Care Committee as an Organization
One question still unanswered is how the FCC can work successfully,
given that all of its members have both personal and departmental goals
which conflict. The most probably explanation is that the FCC acts as
its own organization complete with its own set of policies, operating
procedures, and expected behavior. Rules and expectations delineate
authority and decision-making. These operating procedures enhance
clarity and continuity, and minimize the personal and material conse-
quences.5 As we have already noted, the rules and decision-making are
not unambiguous or predictable as they may seem, but part of this is due
to the type of decisions which are being made (each with its own set of
circumstances) and the hospital environment. 6
As an organization, the FCC has devised its own set of rules (the
policies, eligibility criteria, and their procedures) with which to
handle the weekly applications. Since it has been in operation for about
three -years, it has its own past decisions and policies which prescribe
much of its current activities and decisions. Through the development and
adoption of its norms and policies, its members generally leave behind
their "home" departments' perspectives and mold to the accepted and ex-
The FCC exhibits many qualities of a bureaucracy. These charac-
teristics are discussed in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).
Important elements of the hospital environment include the unde-
fined nature of the products, lack of clear lines of authority, formally
organized yet requiring considerable flexibility, and a unique combina-
tion of autonomy and coordination of highly specialized care. For a com-
plete discussion see Basil S. Georgopoulos and Floyd C. Mann, "Hospitals
as an Organization" in Jonathan S. Rakich and Kurt Darr, eds., Hospital
Organization and Management (New York: Spectrum Publications, 1978).
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pected behavior of the FCC. For example, in reviewing an application the
case presenter may begin to tell about the interview or personal contact
with the individual. Such anecdotal information is expected and enjoyed,
and in fact a certain amount of joking around is acceptable. However, at
some implicitly agreed upon limit, the joking and story-telling halts and
the case is invariably brought to the established criteria and guidelines.
Past decisions and behavior act as checks for consistency and acceptabil-
ity of decision-making.
Further support for the existence of FCC standards and norms of
behavior was uncovered when I asked about block voting. I had hypothesized
that committee members from the same department would tend to vote together
in conformance with their department perspective. All members I inter-
viewed rejected this reasoning and meetings I attended did not reveal any
distinct patterns in voting. In fact, quite often two menbers from the
same department would take opposite views on a case only to be reconciled
with a compromise solution or the reaffirmation of a piece of decisive
inforriation. These indicate that the FCC has developed into an organiza-
tion unto itself and accountable essentially only to itself.
These organizational tendencies are reinforced by the lack of
supervision from outside or higher up influences. The CEO and the Board
do not have any direct control over free care decisions (except the Board
which must approve their policies) and basically have delegated the total
responsibility for providing free care to the Free Care Committee.
Nominally the FCC is accountable to the Chief Fiscal Officer but he
does not review its work. Thus, not -only does the FCC act as an organiza-
tion with its own accepted standArds of behavior but its formal authority
has it quite insulated from outside influences..
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In summary, although not formally investigated, there is probably
widespread agreement among the hospital administration as to the general
goals of the hospital and the delivery of free care. For example, every-
one on the staff would agree that patients should not be denied admission
or receive inferior medical care because of an inability to pay the
hospital bill. Similarly, the hospital should provide "quality medicine,"
serve the community, and advance medical knowledge.
Beyond the ambiguities of the general goals there seems to be con-
siderable disagreement and uncertainty surrounding the numerous sub-
organizational goals. As pointed out, these sub-unit goals often do not
necessarily coincide with the general goals and, in fact, become the
primary goals of each sub-unit. That is, each group in performing its
purpose has its own functional requirements that it must meet before the
overall goals of the organization can be met. Each department plays a
role in the total operation of the hospital but it has its own needs and
goals to be met first before it can meet the higher level goals of the
hospital. The hospital, in its delivery of free care must be seen as a
social system, shaped by the numerous sub-organizational goals and purposes
which, as they interact, force adjustments to be made and determine the
final form of the hospital organization.
Functional and Dysfunctional Consequences of the Regulation
The Hill-Burton regulation has had many unintended consequences due
to the various departmental goals, the incentive systems, and the norms of
the FCC. The fulfillment of some of the department goals will be achieved
For a discussion of functionalism see'Nicos Mouzelis, Organiza-
tion and Bureaucracy (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1969).
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to the detriment of the overall goal of providing free care. When such
a function of a part hinders the goals of the whole, it is known as a
dysfunctional consequence. Note that a single action may be viewed as
functional by one group and dysfunctional by another. For example, the
provision of free care is dysfunctional for the CEO and the fiscal ac-
countant who are trying to meet their primary goals of financial viability
and minimizing hospital losses. Yet the same provision of care is seen by
the social services, the community, and the recipients of the care as
functional since it serves their primary goals.
Other functional consequences ("functional" from my perspective or
in relation to the objectives of the regulation) of the -regulation include:
- the admitting desk is more careful about completing its
admitting forms;
- the hospital has a better knowledge of its losses;
- the hospital has saved some money by hiring governmental
program coordinators to check applicants' eligibility
for other programs;
- improved patient contact for patient accounts managers;
- the FCC members have a deeper understanding of health
care issues and a forum for their discussion;
- the FCC has improved the working relations with the
departments represented;
- some physicians have a better knowledge of the costs of
hospital care;
- the hospital has contacts with several governmental agen-
cies;
- physicians' power in the long run decreases if their
practices are increasingly scrutinized.
However, these functional aspects have not been without accompany-
ing dysfunctions. These are less numerous and probably are outweighed by
their beneficial counterparts. They include:.
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- increased skepticism and distrust of the government;
- increased resentment towards the government;
- doctors can look more concerned with profits than with
health;
- doctors may grow impatient with free care and not serve
indigents at all, but only those patients who can pay
cash, and may take themselves out of serving in the
emergency room;
- the availability of free care at this hospital may have
distributional effects on other hospitals in the area.
Most of these effects were unanticipated--all except those specific to
providing free care, and many may be latent, in that the hospital admin-
istrator or the regulator may not have realized these impacts.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION
Having outlined the application process in detail, analyzed its
outcomes, and described the effects of the regulation on the organization,
I would like to make some concluding remarks about the success of this
policy at Prescott Hospital. As previously stated, certain aspects of
the Hill-Burton Act were very successful. For example, it increased the
supply of uncompensated services, improved interdepartmental communication,
and saved the hospital thousands of dollars by transfering patients to
other governmental programs. The first section of this chapter analyzes
the characteristics of the implementation which made the delivery of free
care successful.
The second section highlights those characteristics which have
contributed to the regulation not being totally successful. Although
the program may be deemed successful relative to other hospitals' experi-
ences or to what existed before at Prescott, it failed in one important
respect: it did not improve significantly the accessibility of health
care to poor people. Although the financial burdens for those individuals
receiving free care or reduced cost care have been relieved, the regula-
tion has not induced indigents, who otherwise would go untreated, to
receive medical care. The second section of this chapter investigates
what elements of the regulation, as implemented, have inhibited the
achievement of this objective. The chapter concludes with three sugges-
tions for improving the regulation: 1) increase accessibility of hospital
care; 2) ensure fairness of the decisions and policies; and 3) simultane-
ously meet the goals of cost reduction. Several of these suggestions
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came from the staff interviewed and are their views of where the system
can be "tightened up." Others represent my outside perspective on where
the provision of uncompensated services can be improved. Finally, alter-
native ways of achieving the same objectives of the regulation are dis-
cussed. If one of the goals of the Hill-Burton Act is to provide uncom-
pensated services to indigents, there may well be better approaches for
achieving redistribution.
What Makes the Regulation Successful?
The most important factor in making this regulation successful at
Prescott is the institution of the Free Care Committee. . Because the mem-
bership is structured to be diverse, the decisions it makes and policies
it sets are more patient-oriented and responsive to individual circum-
stances than in other hospitals. In addition, since it has been in
operation for almost three years, it has developed its own bureaucratic
characteristics through the past decisions it has made. The FCC is an
unusual innovation which has served the patients and social workers well.
The outcomes of such a committee are very different (and much more lenient)
than if a single fiscal administrator were making decisions about appli-
cants. In the present process, many factors are considered in each final
decision made, not simply its impact on hospital losses.
The establishment of the FCC has been directly or indirectly re-
sponsible for 1) the development of more lenient guidelines than those
minimally required by law, 2) the improved communication between depart-
ments within the hospital and between the hospital and outside govern-
mental agencies, and 3) the use of unofficial decisions which significantly
improve the situations for many individuals (for example, deferred pay-
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ments, reduction of the physician bill).
What Factors Inhibit the Regulation's Success?
The most important reason why the regulation has not been totally
successful is that it does not specify exactly how the regulation will be
implemented. In providing this flexibility, the regulators have accepted
a continuum of outcomes which will be "successful" to varying degrees.
For example, a hospital under one option may have to provide $700,000
worth of uncompensated services, while another hospital may operate under
the open door option and give out $40,000. Both may be in compliance yet
the amounts of service provided vary considerably. By giving the hospitals
a choice of compliance options, the regulation allows the hospitals to
select the cheapest option, not necessarily the most beneficial one.
Another source of failure is the regulation itself. Any required
dollar amount immediately becomes a minimum and will not be exceeded.
In addition, a dollar figure is no measure of the distribution of the
uncomptnsated services or of -service accessibility. The regulation does
not specifically address these two critical issues and consequently fails
with respect to them.
A third problem is that the regulation does not require the State
Office to evaluate facilities on the basis of accessbility or distribution
of benefits. Therefore, the Office does not place much importance on
these considerations. Moreover, the funding available for monitoring
facility compliance is minimal if at all existent. The State Office is
limited in terms of its personnel, expertise, and funds to be able to
carry out an effective enforcement and monitoring program.
In addition to the unsupportive environment for the State Office
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to enforce the regulation, there is a similar discouraging atmosphere
within the hospital. Both the administration and the physicians in
general are not enthusiastic about the provision of free care, although
for very different reasons. On the one hand the administration is cost
conscious and has difficulty in seeing beyond the dollars lost in the
process. Most physicians, on the other hand, are ignorant about the
availability of free care and therefore are limited in their ability to
improve accessibility. Consequently, the two most powerful and visible
groups, the administration and the medical staff, do not encourage im-
proving the availability and accessibility of free care. Given the inef-
fective enforcement by the State and the lack of commitment by the hospi-
tal, it is little wonder that the regulation is not as successful as it
could be.
Improvements
The improvements suggested by the hospital and myself center on
three'issues: 1) improving accessibility; 2) improving the decisions
made; and 3) decreasing the overall operating costs for the hospital at
the same time as meeting the uncompensated services requirement.
Improving Accessibility. More patients will learn about the
availability of free care if it were posted on all hospital bills.
While such a notice is presently required for emergency accounts, it is
not observed by the hospitals or enforced by the State. Another tactic
could be to make the notice in the paper more visible and more compre-
hendable. The State Office could draw up standard formats for the hospi-
tals to use. Similar formats could also be used for the posted signs
within the hospital. Prescott regently changed its signs to ones that
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are comprehendable but individuals still have to track down what the
eligibility tequirements are, since they are not included in the sign
(see Appendix B). This information barrier may easily deter eligible
people from applying. Another way to improve awareness is to include
information on free care in the admissions package given to all inpa-
tients. It could simply state the availability of free care, the e.ligibil-
ity requirements, and outline the application process. It is also advised
that this section highlight the limitations of many insurance policies and
state that free care can be awarded to cover the difference between cov-
erage and the actual hospital bill.
A different approach focuses its efforts on the awareness of the
physicians, who could, but presently do not, play an important role in
the dissemination of information. Physicians could be informed at a
general medical staff meeting of the entire free care process. This
would dispel the myth that some physicians have that the hospital has to
"use up" a certain minimum volume of free care after which the hospital
has no obligations. In addition, the physicians could be encouraged to
use the social services. Since the social service workers are more
aware of free care, this could increase accessibility.
Improving the Decisions Made. Putting a physician on the FCC would
also improve the quality of the decisions that it made. That is, the
decisions would be more "fair"'or appropriate (say in terms of the
medical necessity of a procedure for an individual). The physician, at
times, would assume the role of an advocate for the patient,'making the
care more accessible. At other times, the physician would give the FCC
the credibility it needs in some situations.
Decreasing Unnecessary Hospital Costs. Although this is not a
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goal of the Hill-Burton Act, there are a couple of suggestions which
could improve the efficiency of the administration of the uncompensated
services requirement. First, the hospital could develop a better screen-
ing process to check the validity of the application. This could be done
in two ways. The hospital could buy the available computer linkages with
Blue Cross in order to immediately obtain the status of the alleged
policy holders. In addition, the patient accounts managers or social
service workers could attempt to verify the information on the applica-
tion. The easiest items to check are the person's address (to ensure
that the applicant meets the residency requirement) and the present
employment. While obviously not thorough, these two checks would help
to weed out "chistlers" of the system and could signifidantly reduce
costly administrative inefficiencies. Second, the FCC could make it its
policy to send a copy of the hospital bill for each free care patient to
the attending physician. This would increase physician awareness about
the total costs of hospital care and may, in the long run, affect their
behavior. If lag time was reduced and more admissions were monitored,
the costs could be reduced.
Improvements at the State Office. Most of the previously mentioned
suggestions center on improvements the hospital could make. As already
noted, the State Office does a poor job of monitoring compliance and es-
sentially relies on the honesty of the facility report and complaints to
police the regulation. One suggestion was for the State to improve its
enforcement and monitoring functions by having specific funds allocated
for these purposes. In addition, the State could hire an accountant so
that it could be capable of monitoring compliance reports. More personnel
would also allow them to do more than process complaints, and to be more
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aggressive in its monitoring efforts. Another tactic the State could
take would bt to change what it monitored from only checking outcome
measures to including process measures. This would enable the State to
learn much more about developing effective policies by studying how
organizations implement and adapt to regulations. Investigations into
the processes within hospitals could yield useful information about. pos-
sible regulations regarding implementation. In addition, analyzing
processes would allow the State to do much more meaningful evaluations.
For example, last year in reviewing Prescott Hospital the State Office
discovered that the hospital signs were not translated into Armenian.
The State Office immediately attacked the hospital and spent considerable
time haggling over the sign's text and translation. Yet, if the State
Office had investigated the process of free care at Prescott, it would
have realized that despite superficial appearances (a lack of proper
signs), in fact the hospital was meeting the intent of the law. Rather
than expend limited resources on this case, the State Office should have
been investigating one of the other hospitals where the objectives of the
regulation are clearly and consistently not met. It is important to note
that while process evaluations would yield more complete information
about a hospital's compliance, it would also increase the State's discre-
tion to determine what constituted compliance.
In conclusion, it is redommended that the regulations be kept
general, emphasizing their intent rather than the details of implementa-
tion. This flexibility allows the facility to adopt procedures which
best suit its circumstances. What has made the regulation successful at
1 For a clear description of how government agencies can develop
learning capacities see Donald Schon, Beyond the Stable State (New York:
Random House, 1971).
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this hospital is precisely this independence. The FCC is successful be-
cause it wants te do a good job, the incentives at work being purposive
and solidary ones. Increased supervision and detailed implementation
guidelines would destroy the most effective monitoring devices the regula-
tion currently has: conscientious workers. Moreover, the flexible ap-
proach minimizes the negative and dysfunctional consequences of the regu-
lation.
Summary
Based on the experience at Prescott, it would seem that benefits
from the flexibility and independence of the Free Care Committee outweigh
the negative aspects. Therefore, changes to improve the regulation should
center on other aspects such as the State's lack of enforcement or moni-
toring efforts. An easily administered change would be to have hospital
bills have a notice about the availability of free care. This would sig-
nificantly improve awareness and therefore accessibility. The Committee
should also include a physician to increase its visibility and credibil-
ity. In addition, the State should begin to enforce non-compliance and
utilize the sanctions at its disposal. Otherwise, these tools lose their
effectiveness because they are not taken seriously. The establishment of
a committee to make policies and process applications has been effective
at this hospital and should be instituted at other hospitals to investi-
gate the degree to which this can be generalized. The effectiveness of
this innovation may be applicable to other facilities and enhance the
accessibility of medical care to indigents who are not covered by other
government programs.
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The Distribution of Costs within the Health Care System
The qiestion of the distribution of costs often came up in discus-
sions with various hospital staff. All of the staff recognized the im-
portance of cross-subsidization of care by insurance policy holders to
non-policy holders. For example, no one seemed surprised that Blue Cross
reimburses the hospital's bad debt at 30%--such redistribution is eNxected.
Yet many members commented that it did not seem fair that Prescott was
singled out as having an increased obligation to treat in'digents because
of some loan it had taken out years ago. This criticism is well taken--
if the point of the regulation is to make medical care accessible to in-
digents then there is no rationale for singling out specific institutions.
Rather, all facilities should contribute towards achieving this goal and
the costs of treating indigents should be distributed evenly. Given that
the principle objective of the uncompensated services requirement is to
assure care to indigents, there are more equitable ways to achieve this
goal.
- Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the
alternative forms of redistribution, let me briefly outline the form which
an analysis might take. The government presently uses many mechanisms to
redistribute income and provide services to indigents, including vouchers,
taxes, direct cash payments, cross-subsidization through reimbursement,
and government-financed clinics. None of these alternatives were con-
sidered by the government when it developed the community services re-
quirement. However, any one of these mechanisms could be used to redis-
tribute income and provide health services.
Each method has its own set of dysfunctional characteristics--
government-run facilities would promote a dual class system of care,
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voucher systems and subsidies often result in scandals, and direct cash
payments cannot be targeted to have specific outcomes. The trick then is
to devise a program which minimizes the dysfunctional consequences while
still managing to be an effective method of redistribution. It may be
that the present cross-subsidization should be expanded such that free
care provided is reimbursed at a rate which does not penalize the pro-
vider. While this method would distribute costs more evenly, it does not
address questions of persistent inaccessibility and regional imbalances.
A careful analysis of each alternative considering 1) the func-
tional consequences, 2) the dysfunctional impacts, 3) the costs of imple-
mentation and administration, 4) technical problems, and 5) political
considerations needs to be done before any recommendations can be made.
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Appendix 3
IN COMPLIANCE WITH STATE AND FEDERAL
REGULATIONS,
WILL GIVE A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF SER-
VICE AT NO COST OR LESS THAN FULL COST
TO PATIENTS WHO MEET ELIGIBILITY REQUIRE-
MENTS. GUIDELINES AND APPLICATION FORMS
MAY BE OBTAINED AT THIS DESK. IF YOU THINK
THAT YOU ARE ELIGIBLE, PLEASE CONTACT
OUR PATIENT ACCOUNTS OFFICE AND ASK
FOR ASSISTANCE.
IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH RESULTS. YOU MAY APPEAL
THE DECISION AND/OR CONTACT THE STATE HILL-BURTON
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 80 BOYLSTON
STREET, 726-7623.
PATIENT ACCOUNTS OFFICE EXTENSIONS: IN-PATIENT 1607
OUT-PATIENT 1680
/) /
Appendix A
[]In-Patient Dae of Admission
Noter Separate applicatinn- necessary for each admissiont
COutpatient Gaiance of Bill: Application for Uncompensated Servicesat Provided Under G.L. Mass. Chapter 30A
Patient Name. Ag Street Addrear
City State Zip Code Phone Occupation even it not currently employedi
Name of Person Reeponsible for Bi Street Addrns City Phone
Dependent Name, Retationsmo and Ages-
SOURCES OF INCOME
Nam of Employer Of Potimnt or Reponsiben Person emporry unNmployed, anticpated dat of
employmeont
CRtY Staem Zip Code Phn mivetIV.
CParo.TIme F ~u .Tim
Hiow Lorg EmpVoved Ineome Aftte.Taxes:
p er w eek / month / y ear C Cirle Oneo
Any income /support from spouse, dependents, Parents, Gtc Nome of Persofn with income Addres
Reictionemp to Patient Amount of Income af tot taxes
- -per week / month /Year C rete onei
Misa. incomefrom Rent, Pension, Social Security, Vetecansr, Unemployment
Compenseadon, Trust Punds. Welfare, etc.
Names W Sources Ameunp- w / mont/ One
PERSONAL ASSETS AMOUNT Do you owr any Real Estate other than the house in which
you live? C[Yes []No if yes, explain below.
Savings Account
Health Insurance: Name of Carrier:
StocksBonds, etc;
Other ji.Amount Paid (if individual contract):
INDEBTEDNESS TO WHOM OWED MO. PAYMENT BALANCE
Rent or Mortgage
Banks, etc. t
Charge Accounts
Auto Loan-
Auto, Life, Health & Home
Owners Insurance
Medical Bills
Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Only applications which are complete will be considered.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the information I have given is correct, true and complete.
Signature of Patient or Responsible Person Date
Please note that this application for "Free Care" is for hospital charges only, we are unable to consider private physician/anesthesia charge.
If you have any questions, please call our Patient Accounts Office - Inpatient, ext. 1607 - Outpatient, ext. 1680.
Date:
For Hospital Use Only:
Recommended by, Date Approved by:E
4 Hospital Financial No. Amount Approved:
Unit Record No. Additional information can be supplied on reverse side.
